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Kersey 1
Introduction

Foreign aid in the United States was born at the end of World War II with two
purposes in mind: European recovery and the creation of strong economic ties between
the United States and the Western world. However, as soon as the 1950s, foreign aid
evolved into a foreign policy tool primarily used to provide security for the recipient state
and the United States’ own global interests (Hastedt 2003, 349). Though the perceived
uses of foreign aid would continue to grow and change over the next fifty years to include
the encouragement of economic development, the connection between foreign aid and the
United States’ national security would continue to be the primary force driving the
United States’ foreign aid policy.
The connection between the United States’ foreign assistance policy and the real
and perceived security threats facing the United States in the second half of the 20th
century is evident in the language used to discuss foreign aid in the United States, the
development of the United States’ foreign assistance bureaucracy, and the
correspondence between fluctuations in the amount of aid distributed and important
historical events. Though an examination of these facets of the United States’ aid
distribution policies illuminates the connection between foreign aid and security in the
United States, it does little to demonstrate the effects these distribution policies have on
recipient states. In order to demonstrate these effects more clearly it is necessary to study
U.S. aid policy towards specific recipient countries and the effects these policies have
had on them. However, the sheer size of the United States foreign assistance program
prohibits a complete study of foreign assistance policies to all recipient countries. Rather
than embarking on an impossible effort to assess the United States’ foreign assistance
policies in each country receiving US foreign aid, this paper concentrates on the United
States foreign assistance policy to Afghanistan and Nicaragua between 1947 and 2001.
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Though Afghanistan and Nicaragua have incredibly different cultures, histories,
and locations, both countries have experienced the implementation of similar foreign
assistance policies from the United States. The similarity of these policies demonstrates
that United States foreign assistance policy decisions were consistently based on national
security concerns, regardless of the geographic location, culture, and history of individual
recipient countries. Not only were the policies implemented by the United States in
Nicaragua and Afghanistan similar, but the detrimental effects created by these policies
also took on similar forms. An examination of the history of foreign aid in the United
States and the history of aid distribution choices the country has made concerning
Afghanistan and Nicaragua from 1947 to the end of the 20th century demonstrate that the
United States has used the distribution of foreign assistance to combat perceived security
threats. This tactic has led to the creation of instability in recipient countries, increased
real security risks to the United States and hindered the development of countries that are
supposed to be helped by aid flows.
This paper is separated into five parts: Important definitions, United States foreign
assistance history, U.S. foreign assistance policy in Afghanistan, U.S. foreign assistance
policy in Nicaragua and concluding remarks. In the first portion of the paper, I define
foreign assistance and security as they will be used throughout the paper. In the second
part of the paper, I use a study of the history of the United States foreign assistance
program to establish that a strong link exists between national security concerns and
foreign assistance policy decisions made in the United States. In the third and fourth
parts of the paper I discuss the impact the United States foreign assistance policy has had
on Afghanistan and Nicaragua. Both of these parts are divided into five sections. The
first section is a brief introduction to the country, including important background
information and historical events. The following three sections are devoted to the three
key ways in which the United States foreign assistance distribution policies are
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detrimental to recipient countries. The first of these sections demonstrates that the lack
of clear connection between aid flows and the issues facing aid recipients creates
dramatic fluctuations in aid giving which wreak havoc on fragile economies; the second
discusses how the proliferation of weapons and advanced military training in already
turbulent situations increases their danger and helps create a culture of violence within
recipient countries; and the third assesses the extent to which consistent undermining of
existing governments or popular revolutions through US interference into the policies of
recipient countries strips governments of their authority and autonomy. The final
sections of parts three and four of the paper address the nature of the security threats
posed by events taking place in Afghanistan and Nicaragua both before and after U.S.
involvement. In the final part of the paper I discuss the foreign assistance policies
addressed throughout with special emphasis on the results of these policies.

Important Definitions
What, exactly, are foreign assistance and national security?

Before it is possible to prove the United States’ foreign aid policy has been
motivated by security threats and has led to increased instability in recipient countries, it
is necessary to clarify a few key terms which will continue to be important throughout
this paper. The first of these is foreign assistance. Due to the emphasis on the United
States’ foreign assistance policy in this paper, the definition and categories used to
describe foreign assistance are derived from the U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants or
Greenbook, a publication created by the United States Agency for International
Development’s Center for Development Information and Evaluation to serve as a
comprehensive report of all U.S. foreign assistance distributed to the rest of the world
since 1945. This publication will not only provide the definitions and categories aid will
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be divided into within this paper, but also the figures detailing the amount of U.S. aid
distributed to the world and, more specifically, to Afghanistan and Nicaragua from 1947
to 2000.
The “Reporting Concepts” section of the Greenbook separates foreign assistance
into three overarching categories - economic assistance, military assistance, and nonconcessional support - which are further separated by more specific funding categories
that fall under these comprehensive headings. Of the three categories, economic and
military assistance will figure most prominently in this paper. According to the
Greenbook, economic assistance is equivalent to Official Development Assistance
(ODA) or “grants or loans to [developing] countries and territories which are (a)
undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and
welfare as the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms [if a loan, having a
Grant Element (q.v.) of at least 25 per cent]” (OECD 2005). The economic assistance
category includes funds distributed by USAID and its predecessor organizations, Food
Aid, and other economic assistance and is also divided based on the program this funding
is slated to aid. Though the main focus of sections of this paper devoted to the effects of
the United States’ economic assistance policy will be bilateral aid from the United States
that fits the standard ODA definition, it is important to note that economic assistance
provided to or withheld from Afghanistan and Nicaragua by other countries or lending
institutions due to U.S. influence will also be mentioned.
In addition to discussing economic assistance as foreign aid, this paper will also
discuss military assistance. Though military assistance is less often considered in papers
discussing the impact of foreign aid, it is important that this type of assistance be
included in a paper discussing the link between the United States’ foreign assistance
policy, security and stability as military assistance is often motivated by security
concerns and has a crucial impact on the stability of recipient countries. By virtue of the
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smaller amounts of U.S. assistance that qualify as military assistance, the Greenbook’s
treatment of this category is much less complex than the economic assistance category.
Under the military assistance heading only two subcategories - loans and grants - exist.
Though military assistance is, like economic assistance, further separated by the program
funding is intended to aid, a clear definition for exactly what physically constitutes
military assistance in the United States is absent from the Greenbook. However, it is
clear that military assistance is classified as such because these loans and grants are
comprised of money the United States intends recipient countries to use for military
equipment and training. In addition to the official military assistance recorded in the U.S.
Overseas Loans and Grants, the sections of this paper devoted to the impact of U.S.
military assistance policy on Afghanistan and Nicaragua will also include references to
and descriptions of covert aid given by the United States to resistance groups within these
countries. Though this is not official bilateral aid, it is included as military assistance for
three reasons: it is funding intended for the upkeep of military forces and actions; it is a
strong indicator of the motivations of the United States’ foreign aid policy; and it has a
powerful impact on recipient countries.
Though United States foreign assistance and its distribution will be the primary
focus of this paper, the United States’ national security will also figure prominently
throughout. Security, like many other terms used in the social sciences, is frequently
used and often left unclearly defined. In fact, scholars of security studies David Baldwin
and Helen Milner, have even argued that “the concept of national security is one of the
most ambiguous and value-laden terms in social science” (Terriff 1999, 1). The
difficulty of defining security stems from the necessity of making a value judgment in
order to create a definition. Without identifying a perspective from which security is
perceived, it would be impossible to truly assess the relative safety of any situation. As
this paper will focus on the foreign assistance choices made by the United States
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government in the latter half of the 20th century due to security threats, it is important to
establish an understanding of security from the perspective of the United States
government during this time period. However, because the definition of security used by
the United States during the Cold War was heavily skewed by strict adherence to anticommunist ideology, the security threats discussed in this paper will also be identified as
either real or perceived security threats.
During the cold war, definitions of national security in the United States could all
be traced back to a single origin, the containment doctrine created by George F. Kennan
in 1947 (Gaddis 2005, 24). Kennan defined the security of the United States as “the
continued ability of this country to pursue the development of its internal life without
serious interference, or threat of interference, from foreign powers” (Ibid., 26). This view
of security was so prominent during the cold war that it led “largely to the exclusion of
other perspectives” (Terriff 1999, 1). As a result, when most policy makers, political
scientists, and other social scientists discussed security from 1947 to 2001, they agreed
they were talking about the use and management of military force and the protection of
the state from attack (Ibid.).
Though protecting the United States from foreign invasion was a crucial part of
Kennan’s definition of security, he also asserted that the United States had a
responsibility “to advance the welfare of its people, by promoting a world order in which
this nation can make the maximum contribution to the peaceful and orderly development
of other nations and derive the maximum benefit from their experiences and abilities”
(Gaddis 2005, 26). This perspective, combined with Kennan’s views on security, gave
birth to the doctrine of containment, the primary perspective on national security during
the cold war. As time passed and the cold war progressed a new clause, “falling
dominos”, was added to the containment doctrine (Hastedt 2003, 50). Under this clause
it was agreed that any communist “territorial gain, no matter how insignificant,
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represented a threat to American security because it could be the first in a row of falling
dominos that could ultimately bring down a vital ally” (Ibid.). It was through adherence
to this belief that divergence from the United States’ ideology became synonymous to an
attack on the United States and was handled as a threat to the country’s national security.
Due to the fact that the perspective on national security derived from the
containment doctrine viewed divergence from strict capitalist, democratic ideology as a
security threat to the United States, it only allowed countries to occupy two categories,
ally or enemy. The narrowness of this perspective forced countries into categories that
did not accurately define them. It also considerably elevated the number of events the
United States categorized as national security risks. As a result, the United States made a
number of foreign assistance policy decisions due to perceived security threats. Unlike
real security threats, which were likely to cause physical harm to the United States or its
allies, create intense instability in a country or region, or were directly linked to the
Soviet Union in a plan to spread communism, perceived security threats were often
rooted in misconceptions arising from the fear of communist expansion and possessed
unclear, unfounded, or superficial links to the Soviet Union. Though these two categories
do not attempt to redefine national security, they do provide a vocabulary with which to
address the foreign assistance policy decisions made by the United States during the
second half of the 20th century.
United States foreign assistance history
Increasing fear increases assistance
“For the United States, aid as an instrument of development and aid as an
instrument of the Cold War were one in the same (White 1974, 219).”
“Since the late 1940s U.S. assistance activities have often been motivated
more by our own security concerns than by the objective needs of the
countries we have attempted to assist (Ruttan 1996, xviii).”
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After World War II the United States found itself in a unique position of
economic and political power in the world. The European nations, ravaged by war, were
struggling to recover while the division between the Soviet Union and the United States
continued to grow. With their only allies against the Soviets in great need of economic
support to recover, the United States established the first comprehensive proposal for
development assistance, the Marshall Plan. This plan, which began in 1947 and lasted
about three years, was engineered to help the European countries rebuild. During this
three year period about $40 billion to $50 billion a year was given to European nations
(O’Hanlon 1997, 63).

With this aid, Europe was able to use its preexisting institutions,

skills and social relationships for rapid development to recover quickly (White 1974,
200); within the decade the recipients of Marshall Plan aid were once again economically
stable and politically active on the world scene.
The success of the Marshall Plan not only helped restore the European nations, it
also created intense optimism concerning the power of economic transfers from the
United States to other countries. This optimism and a keen awareness of the changing
international system led to the creation of a new foreign policy initiative: foreign
assistance. During the next fifteen years the political groundwork to establish foreign aid
as an accepted part of the United States’ foreign policy would be laid as the program’s
objectives and institutions were revised and established. Throughout this process, United
States foreign assistance evolved from a successful foreign policy tool used to tackle the
United States immediate concerns on the world stage, such as the reconstruction of
Western European nations, to a development tool that could be used to make the United
States safer while simultaneously making other nations more prosperous. Despite these
changes, the United States’ national security concerns would remain a key factor in
determining the amount of funding and support the foreign assistance program would
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receive. Even after foreign aid objectives grew to encompass development in recipient
nations, the United States’ national security concerns would continue to be the primary
consideration in determining the focus and amount of aid flows. Throughout its
development in the United States, foreign aid policy and flows would remain inextricably
linked to the nation’s security concerns.
The first steps in the evolution of foreign assistance were taken during Harry S.
Truman’s presidency. After implementing the Marshall Plan, Truman created the
Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) in 1950 in order to help make “the benefits
of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and
growth of underdeveloped areas” (Butterfield 2004, 1). In addition to demonstrating
recognition that the needs of countries in the developing world were different from those
of Europe, where the institutions, skills, and social bonds necessary for development
were already present, the establishment of the TCA demonstrated the presence of
humanitarian motivation for aid in the United States.
Despite the presence of this motivation, security concerns were clearly the
primary force motivating aid throughout the Truman administration and during most of
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s presidency as well. The dominance of security concerns was
clear in everything from the title of aid legislation to the areas where aid was distributed.
When aid proposals were first combined into a single legislative package in 1951, the act
presented to Congress was entitled the Mutual Securities Act. This legislation indicated
the United States’ belief that assistance could be beneficial for the security of both donor
and recipient. The act also created the Mutual Securities Agency (MSA) to be
responsible for “all financial and technical aid and for some aspects of military
assistance” (Butterfield 2004, 36). Though Eisenhower would indicate the new concern
for the development of recipient countries growing within the United States foreign
assistance dialogue by replacing the existing foreign aid institutions with the International
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Cooperation Administration in 1955 (Ibid. 39), these efforts would not greatly alter the
extreme emphasis on security present in the 1950s. The dominance of security concerns
was demonstrated by the continued use of the Mutual Securities Act title for foreign
assistance legislation until 1961 and by the choices the United States made concerning
aid recipients. Between 1953 and 1957, the greatest part of the United States’ economic
aid was delivered to Greece, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam,
Taiwan, the Philippines, and Korea (Nelson 1968, 3). These countries were selected to
become recipients of high amounts of aid due to their proximity to the Soviet Union and
China, the United States involvement in the Korean War, and the United States fear that
communism was gaining strength across Asia.
Despite the fact that foreign assistance rhetoric and distribution during the
Eisenhower presidency support the conclusion that the primary objective conceived for
foreign aid throughout the 1950s was simply to immediately address security issues,
some of the legislation enacted under Eisenhower demonstrated the growing emphasis on
the development aspect of foreign assistance. The first piece of legislation to indicate
this was enacted in 1954, when Public Law 480 (P.L. 480), the legal basis for food aid
from the United States to other nations, was passed. Though this occurred thanks in large
part to lobbying by the American Farm Bureau Association and farmers who feared the
effects that agricultural surpluses facilitated by Depression era policies would have on
their incomes (Singer 1987, 22), it also demonstrated the growing belief that foreign aid
policies could be used as tools to improve life both in the United States and elsewhere.
This belief was reiterated in 1957 when Eisenhower created the Development Loan Fund
to provide loans in the form of US dollars to developing countries for projects they were
unable to fund through private capital (Butterfield 2004, 54). Though the creation of
such an institution, in and of itself, demonstrates a growing interest in the development of
recipient countries, the revolutionary decision to allow DLF loan repayment in the
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currency of the borrowing nation indicated the extent of the growing commitment to
ensuring developing nations were truly aided by foreign assistance (Ibid).
This commitment became an even larger focus of foreign assistance policy during
the presidency of John F. Kennedy. During his inaugural speech in 1961, the new
president famously declared foreign aid should be used to help people in developing
countries, “not because the communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes,
but because it is right” (Ibid., 57). The changes Kennedy made during his first year in
office seemed to support this concept. He began by proposing the separation of military
and economic assistance into two categories in a new foreign aid bill entitled the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961. This piece of legislation not only revolutionized aid through the
policies it suggested, it also ushered in a new aid vocabulary that placed more emphasis
on development and less on security. In addition to proposing new legislation, the
Kennedy administration also introduced a new institution, the Agency for International
Development (USAID), to coordinate development assistance in the United States.
Unlike the aid bureaucracy that came before it, USAID was an autonomous institution
charged with executing foreign assistance plans the world over according to a single
comprehensive policy (USAID History 2005).
The changes enacted during Kennedy’s presidency reflected the growing interest
in economic aid for development. However, they also reflected President Kennedy’s
ability to “[translate] the security concerns of the 1950s into greater support for economic
development assistance” (Ruttan 1996, 92). Though much of the rhetoric used
emphasized the importance of development in poor nations, Kennedy’s final rational for
foreign assistance was the argument that without it “our own security would be
endangered and our prosperity imperiled” (USAID History 2005). These remarks
indicate that even though foreign assistance policy was changing to create a separation
between economic and military aid, security concerns had not receded as the primary
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motivation for both types of assistance. “The basic assumption was that the
establishment of ‘a preponderance of stable, effective, and democratic societies gives the
best promise of a peaceful settlement of the Cold War and of a peaceful progressive
environment’” (White 1974, 219).
Both this assumption and the changes in foreign assistance policy made under the
Kennedy administration proved to be lasting. Though Richard Nixon made a failed
attempt to alter the structure of the foreign aid program when he entered office in 1969
(Butterfield 2004, 175) and Jimmy Carter created the short lived and ineffective
International Development Cooperation Agency during his presidency in the late 1970s
(Ibid, 197), the Foreign Assistance Act and USAID remained the primary instruments of
United States foreign assistance policy from their inception in 1961 through the end of
the 20th century. From this point on, major changes in foreign aid took place in the
amounts and areas of allocation rather than in institutions. Like “the expansion of the aid
program leading up to and including the 1961 initiatives, [which] paralleled an increase
in the perceived security threat of spreading communism” (Ruttan 1996, 70), the changes
in foreign assistance funding and allocation that took place in the latter portion of the 20th
century were heavily impacted by national security concerns.
The impact of the United States security concerns on foreign assistance funding is
demonstrated in Figure 1. This graph shows the fluctuations in the total amounts
allocated for economic and military loans and grants by the United States from 1946 to
2001 along with some key events that reduced or heightened the United States’ emphasis
on national security. The amounts of foreign assistance appropriated each year are taken
from figures made available by the United States Agency for International
Development’s Center for Development Information and Evaluation and are given in
constant 2003 dollars in order to remove considerations of inflation from the analysis.
When viewed together, the correlation between spikes in aid and events that created
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national security concerns for the United States is clear. Large, sudden increases in
foreign assistance funding followed events that increased the United States’ national
security concerns, such as the beginning of the Korean War, the Bay of Pigs, the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution, and the Camp David Accords, while sudden dramatic decreases in
funding followed events that decreased national security concerns, like the removal of
troops from Vietnam and the end of the cold war.
In addition to providing insight concerning the link between security and foreign
assistance funding in the United States, Figure 1 also indicates the respective approaches
various U.S. presidents took towards foreign assistance and the great deal historical
context contributed to these approaches. For example, foreign assistance funding
increased considerably during the Kennedy administration due to the changes in the
foreign assistance program and the Bay of Pigs, but dropped off in the early years of
Lyndon B. Johnson’s presidency. This decrease in foreign assistance would soon
change, as increased U.S. involvement in Vietnam became the most significant security
concern of the United States.
The significance of Vietnam and other major security issues to the distribution of
United States foreign assistance is evident in both the areas of the world large amounts of
aid were distributed to and the policy choices made by American presidents. Figure 2
shows the percentage of foreign assistance distributed to six areas of the world during
five important historical periods. The figures presented in this table indicate that foreign
assistance distribution is concentrated in areas where the largest security concern for the
United States originates. This was especially true of U.S. involvement in Vietnam,
which, according to Figure 2, encouraged the United States to distribute 61% of foreign
aid to Asia in 1964. Involvement in South-East Asia would lead the Johnson
administration to increase the number of USAID advisors in Vietnam from 300 to 1,000
in the short span of sixty days (Butterfield 2004, 93) and ensure the decisions on foreign
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assistance policy made by the administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford were
altered by growing opposition to the Vietnam War in the United States. Nixon’s efforts
to make his own mark on foreign assistance were overturned in Congress in favor of
changes directed by the legislative body (Ibid., 175) while the backlash against U.S.
commitments in the world led Ford to allow aid appropriations to stagnate until 1976
(Ibid., 197). Even the Carter administration was impacted by the ghost of Vietnam.
Though he was able to broker a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt in September
1978 by promising to deliver $3 billion in aid to be split between the two countries each
year for the foreseeable future (Ibid.), Carter was unable to maintain his commitment to
“the restoration of moral purpose in American foreign policy” (Ruttan 1996, 115).
Despite his contributions to increasing the focus on human rights and a dialogue between
the North and South, by the end of his presidency traditional security and economic
concerns took precedent for Carter (Ibid., 121).
The emphasis on security brought about by perceived communist gains in
Afghanistan and Nicaragua at the end of Carter’s presidency became even stronger when
Ronald Reagan entered office in 1981. The new president approached foreign assistance
in a way no president before him had. Not only did he urge a shift from economic
assistance to military and security assistance, Reagan was also determined to give aid to
“friendly nations regarded as threatened by internal or external forces and cut aid to
governments considered unfriendly, uncooperative, or mismanaged” (Ibid.). Reagan’s
intentions to use foreign assistance as a foreign policy tool in the Cold War were not
unusual. However, the aggressive manner in which he regained control of the foreign
assistance program from the legislature and increased the power the executive branch had
over assistance by increasing the bilateral component of the United States assistance
program were very different from the tactics used by presidents that preceded him (Ibid.).
Reagan also began distributing covert assistance to insurgent groups fighting against the
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spread of communism in other nations and increased the percentage of the foreign
assistance budget allocated to the Economic Support Fund, the location from which most
capital for U.S. security interests is obtained, from under 50% in the early 1980s to over
65% in 1985 (Butterfield 2004, 199).
As a result of Reagan’s aggressive tactics the foreign assistance budget steadily
increased throughout his first term as president (see Figure 1). However, scandals
accompanied Reagan’s covert assistance programs and ruined the credibility of his
foreign assistance projects with the American people. Due to lack of support in the
United States and a warming in East-West relations, the second Reagan administration
allowed the legislative branch to regain control of the foreign assistance program,
lessened covert commitments to insurgent groups, and again attempted to participate in
multilateral international institutions (Ruttan 1996, 133). By the end of Reagan’s second
term in 1989, foreign assistance appropriations had dropped considerably and the end of
the cold war was eminent.
The dramatic changes taking place in the international system in the 1990s
removed the context in which the foreign assistance program had always been defined
and presented both an impressive challenge and an impressive opportunity for the
administrations of George Bush and Bill Clinton to redefine the foreign aid program and
its objectives. Unfortunately, neither the Bush administration nor the Clinton
administration took the initiative to revitalize foreign assistance in the United States.
Instead, the aid program stagnated with the USAID administration remaining in disarray
for most of President Bush’s time in office and funding declining steadily from 1985 until
1997 (Butterfield 2004, 219). Trouble for the major foreign assistance institution
continued under the Clinton administration’s downsizing campaign, which cut 60% of
funding to agricultural programs between 1992 and 1997 and decreased the number of
positions in USAID by 30% from 1993 to 1997 (Ibid., 221). The decisions made by
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Bush and Clinton to first ignore and then downsize the foreign assistance program
demonstrate as clearly as the policy of U.S. presidents that utilized foreign assistance,
that the program’s well-being is inextricably linked to the amount of concern present for
U.S. national security.
The evolution of the foreign assistance program in the United States into an
accepted part of the United States foreign policy was driven by the U.S. government’s
efforts to determine the most effective way foreign assistance could be used to address
the communist threat. By 1961 the quest for optimal utilization of the program had led
away from the origin of foreign assistance as a program to address immediate foreign
policy goals by immediately solving problems towards a new view of the program in
which long-term development goals served the interests of the United States national
security. Despite the adoption of a new strategy to address the United States security
interests with long-term development assistance, funding and support for foreign aid
remained dependent on the immediacy of the United States national security concerns.
The strong link between national security and foreign assistance appropriations is
demonstrated in funding fluctuations, as represented in Figure 1 and Figure 2, and in the
policies and rhetoric of the U.S. presidents from Truman to Clinton. Though some
presidents’ policies were more influential and lasting than others, even those who were
inactive demonstrated the impact security concerns had on the United States’ foreign
assistance policy.

U.S. foreign assistance policy in Afghanistan
A brief history

Home to about 28.5 million people, based on an estimate made in July 2004,
Afghanistan is a landlocked country in Southern Asia bordered by Pakistan, Iran,
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Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and China (CIA “Afghanistan” 2005). Though
many citizens of the United States might be hard pressed to find it on a map, Afghanistan
is located at a key intersection between the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia
(Lansford 2003, 31). This location has made Afghanistan a major thoroughfare during
countless military campaigns and imperial conquests including those of Alexander the
Great, the Russian tsars and the British Raj, not to mention those of the United States and
the Soviet Union.
Consequently, when the borders of the Afghan state were delineated they had
little to do with the locations of various cohesive ethnic groups and everything to do with
colonial arguments over land possession. As a result, the inhabitants of Afghanistan
represent 21 different ethnic groups. Many of these groups have a small representation
within Afghanistan and are separated from large populations of their ethnic brothers by
Afghanistan’s borders. Attempts to unite ethnic groups, especially the Pashtuns, within
the borders of a single country continued throughout the twentieth century, increasing
tensions in South Asia. In addition to the divisions created by various ethnic
representations within Afghanistan, there are also sectarian, tribal, racial, and
geographical divisions within the country (Goodson 2001, 12).
Despite the great range of peoples in Afghanistan and the divergent customs of
each of these groups, the population is unified by its shared religious beliefs. Though
different groups interpret and practice Islam in different ways, the religion has played a
major role as a unifier for the many factions within the country (Ibid.). This was first
demonstrated by the cohesion it created during the late nineteenth century in the two
Anglo-Afghan wars: altercations through which the British attempted to place
Afghanistan under its direct control (Johnson 2004, 14). Lucky for the Afghans, the
British agreed to cease their quest for internal control of Afghanistan in return for control
of the country’s external affairs. In this way, Afghanistan was able to play the two major
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powers in South Asia off of each other and maintain its independence from both Russia
and England during the nineteenth century. Afghanistan’s luck with remaining
uninvolved in major conflict continued in the first half of the twentieth century with the
country managing to stay uninvolved in the two World Wars.
However, the end of World War II found Afghanistan once again struggling to
maintain its autonomy. With the British in no position to continue their traditional power
struggle with the Soviets in the region, the Afghan government, led by King Zamir Shah,
feared Soviet domination. In order to combat this lack of balance, officials from the
Afghan government, especially then Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud, began to seek
aid and assistance from the United States. Despite the fact that leaders in Afghanistan
were ready to begin modernizing and would have gladly stood with the U.S. against the
Soviets in the event of Soviet invasion, the United States remained “convinced that
extensive involvement in Afghanistan would merely provide the Soviets with a pretext
for action while overburdening the Afghan budget” (Roberts 2003, 186). As a result of
this belief, the United States remained relatively uninvolved in Afghanistan for the early
part of the post-World War II period. The U.S. did counter the increasing flow of aid
from the Soviet Union to Afghanistan with some aid of its own, but this aid was minimal
and had few positive effects on Afghanistan.
While the United States half heartedly participated in a bidding war with the
Soviets, the first of many changes that would take place within the Afghan government in
the second half of the twentieth century began. Interested in creating a constitutional
monarchy, Zahir Shah promulgated a new constitution in 1964 that also created an
elected, consultative parliament (Rubin 1995, 25). The establishment of the constitution
prevented relatives of the monarchy from holding government positions and began a
decade of “New Democracy” in Afghanistan. This new era also saw the development of
political parties within Afghanistan. Though many groups were created during this time,
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two of the groups that formed during the late 1960s, the communists and the Islamists,
would later become instrumental in the future of Afghanistan.
Founded in January 1965 in the home of Nur Muhammad Taraki (Rasanayagam
2003, 48), the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was the principle
Soviet-oriented Communist organization in Afghanistan (Rubin 1995, 26). The original
objective of the PDPA was to “resolve the fundamental contradictions within Afghan
society” through socialism (Rasanayagam 2003, 48). Though many PDPA leaders
received their military training in the USSR and the party began as a unified force, it split
into two factions, the Khalq led by Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, and the Parcham led by
Babrak Karmal, as early as 1967 (Rubin 1995, 26). The more radical of the two factions,
the Khalq, recruited from the newly educated rural population, mainly tribal Pashtuns
(Ibid.), and believed in creating a socialist state in Afghanistan through violent revolution
(Rasanayagam 2003, 49). In contrast, the leader of the Parcham faction, Karmal,
believed in the ‘national democratic’ road to socialism (Ibid.) and recruited from the
middle and upper classes of the urban elite (Rubin 1995, 26).
During the same year the PDPA was founded, a new offshoot of the Islamic
movement in Afghanistan emerged among students and instructors at Kabul University
(Ibid.). Initially this movement simply consisted of members of the Theology department
at the University participating in “informal groups to discuss Islam’s role in the country
and ways to save it from the threat of communism” (Saikal 2004, 165). However, soon
the movement grew and in 1968 established the Jamiat-i Islami Afghanistan (Islamic
Society of Afghanistan), an Islamists’ organization (Ibid.). A year later, Islamist groups
from the Faculty of Engineering, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, joined forces with the
existing organization and a new group, the Nahzat-e Jawanan-e Musulman-e Afghanistan
(Afghan Muslim Youth Movement) was established. Prominent Islamists, such as
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Ahmad Shah Massoud and Burhanuddin Rabbani, were also key members of these
organizations.
The growing acceptance of Islamist groups as mainstream actors in the Afghan
political spectrum, along with his inability to participate legally in government led
Daoud, with the Parcham faction of the PDPA, to depose King Zahir Shah on July 17,
1973. With the help of newly trained professional military officers, Daoud’s seizure of
power went smoothly. However, in the long run, Daoud’s decision to depose the king
increased instability by obliterating the old succession pattern without installing a new
one. This increased instability in Afghanistan, coupled with increasing cold war tensions
in the 1970s led the US and the USSR to support increased aid flows to political groups
challenging the Afghan regime from Pakistan (Rubin 1995, 26). Daoud responded to
these aid increases with efforts to remove all opposition to his control of the Afghan
government.
In 1974, he repressed the growing Islamic movement by arresting some Islamist
militants, while others fled and took to the hills near Keshem in the province of
Badakhshan, where they were led by Dr Omar. Other Islamist leaders, namely Massoud
and Hekmatyar, were forced to flee to Peshawar, in Pakistan where they received aid
from the Pakistani government and the CIA (Rubin 1995, 27). During this time Daoud
was also making an effort to remove the Parcham elements from influential government
and military posts, a task he completed by 1975 (Rasanayagam 2003, 64). Daoud
continued his efforts to keep the communists from infiltrating his government by
excluding them from the new cabinet formed in January 1977 (Dorronsoro 2005, 83).
Regardless of these efforts, some “closet communists” remained in the government
(Rasanayagam 2003, 64) and still others managed to receive new appointments
(Dorronsoro 2005, 83).
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While Daoud’s efforts to suppress opposition to his government were partially
successful, he was still plagued by attempts to overthrow his regime. Failed attempts to
overthrow the new Daoud government were made by the Islamists in the summer of 1975
and by the military in September 1975 and December 1976 (Ibid., 79). Finally, on April
27, 1978, an attempt to remove Daoud was successful. The self-proclaimed president of
Afghanistan was killed during a communist coup d’état that came to be known as the
Saur Revolution. This revolution, led by a unified PDPA, and backed by the Soviets was
met with indifference by most of the Afghan population. According to Louis Dupree, an
observer, “despite the danger, people queued up for buses- even in the firefight zone!
Taxis honked for tanks to move over, and wove in and out as the fighting continued. At
some corners, traffic policemen motioned for the tanks to pull over to the curb. The tanks
ignored the gestures and rumbled on to their objectives” (Roberts 2003, 213).
Three days after Daoud’s death, the Revolutionary Council announced
Afghanistan would now be known as the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and be led
by Taraki, who would assume the titles of Prime Minister and president of the
Revolutionary Council (Dorronsoro 2005, 86). Though the PDPA had unified in order to
overthrow Dauod, their alliance had predominantly been a result of Soviet pressures and
did not last (Ruibn 1995, 26). Trouble within the new communist government began
almost immediately with Taraki and Amin, the two key party leaders of the Khalq portion
of the PDPA, vying for absolute power over the party. To exacerbate the already existing
turmoil within the communist camp, Taraki’s installation as the president of Afghanistan
was quickly followed by the mobilization of the Islamic groups that had been banished to
Peshawar under Daoud’s rule. These organizations, which were the only organized
political bodies remaining after the splintering of Afghan elites, began training Muslim
soldiers for jihad - “a holy war that can only be waged against non-Muslims and
apostates”- against the communists (Clement 2003, 174). Over the course of their
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struggle with the Soviets, the Afghan resistance and its various components came to be
known as the mujahideen, the plural form of the word mujahid, which is used to identify
practitioners of jihad (Maley 2002, 59).
While the Islamist groups prepared for battle, the Soviet Union began to increase
its involvement within the communist government in Afghanistan. Instability within the
PDPA was mirrored by instability within the Afghan state created by a rebellion in 1978
that began in response to the government’s radical reform program (Goodson 2001, 55).
Despite intense debate in Moscow, increasing turmoil in Afghanistan forced the Soviet
Union to make a visible response to the uncertain hold the PDPA had on Afghanistan.
This response began in 1979 with a considerable increase in the presence of Soviet troops
and advisors to the communist regime in Afghanistan (Clement 2003, 299-300). The
increase in Soviet advisors was just the beginning. Despite international condemnation,
Soviet troops moved into Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. This move began a
thirteen year altercation between the Soviet backed communist regime and soldiers of the
Islamist groups, the mujahideen, who received support from Pakistan, other Islamic
states, and the United States.
War between the mujahideen and the communists lasted throughout the 1980s
with both sides receiving huge amounts of economic and military support from
international forces. For the mujahideen, international support also came in the form of
soldiers, with Muslims from all over South Asia flocking to Afghanistan to join the jihad.
Despite continuing war within Afghanistan, negotiations to create a peace treaty, entitled
the Geneva Accords, began in the U.N. as early as 1985. Though the negotiations of the
Geneva Accords centered on the relationship between Afghanistan’s communist
government and Pakistan with the United States and the USSR in a secondary role, a
separate accord addressed the roles the two superpowers were playing in Afghanistan. In
the second accord negotiated at Geneva in 1988, both the USSR and the USA agreed to
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be guarantors of the peace made between the Afghan government and Pakistan and to a
policy of noninterference in Afghanistan (Ibid., 90).
Despite this agreement, both the USA and the USSR continued to intervene in
Afghan politics. Soviet troops did not withdraw from the country until February 1989
and when they finally departed they left behind a considerable amount of weaponry and
promises to provide more to the communist government in Kabul. Loathe to let the
Soviet Union get the upper hand in their ideological struggle, the United States continued
sending considerable amounts of assistance to the mujahideen through Pakistan until
mujahideen forces took Kabul in April 1992 (Dorronsoro 2005, 238). With the
communist government eliminated and the Gulf War raging, U.S. funding to the
mujahideen stopped and the once unified Islamist force began the fragmentation that
would lead to a decade of civil war.
During this time period the Taliban, a fundamental Islamist group with roots in
the battle against the Soviets, emerged in Southern Afghanistan. The Taliban increased
its power and appeal quickly and by 1996, the group was in control of most of
Afghanistan, including Kabul, Herat, and Jalalabad (Ibid., 248). Due to the stability they
brought to Afghanistan and their ability to bring the opium trade under control, the
Taliban began their time in power with the United States’ support. However, this
recognition of the Taliban dissolved quickly as the U.S. became disillusioned with the
radical nature of the Taliban regime and the extreme human rights violations they
committed. As the 1990s ended, these issues were exacerbated by the Taliban’s
connections with Osama bin Laden, a former mujahideen supporter whose anti-Western
rhetoric became increasingly violent during the 1990s and whose network of operatives,
Al’Quaida, were linked to a number of anti-American bombings. Though they meant
little to Afghanistan at the time, these bombings were a harbinger of events to come in
the next century.
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Failures in economic funding: From Helmand to Qandahar

Despite extensive efforts on the part of the Afghan government to court the
United States, the U.S. refused to deepen its relationship with the South Asian state.
Instead, for much of the post-war era the United States provided minimal economic aid
and required this aid be used for ill-conceived development projects orchestrated by
American companies. The lack of interest the United States paid to Afghanistan coupled
with the interest the US paid to the country’s neighbors led Afghanistan to turn to the
Soviet Union to acquire funding for development projects. Increased funding from the
Soviet Union soon led to a half-hearted bidding war between the United States and the
USSR. Despite the slight increase in U.S. economic aid this bidding war heralded,
Afghanistan was never able to encourage the United States to devote as much economic
assistance to its needs as the U.S. devoted to Pakistan and Iran. Consequently,
Afghanistan’s development was purchased at the cost of increased dependence on the
Soviet Union. After this dependence led to Soviet invasion and then all out civil war,
Afghanistan’s development was abandoned by the United States; first in favor of military
assistance to the mujahideen resistance fighters and later, when the threat of Soviet take
over disappeared, in favor of relative neglect.
When World War II ended, Britain was in no condition to maintain its traditional
position of influence within Asia. With no Western power to balance out the Soviets,
Afghanistan immediately turned to the United States to take the place of Britain in South
Asian politics. The initial response from U.S. officials to requests for aid was
unenthusiastic. By the time the United States became willing to become a presence in
South Asia, it had already chosen Pakistan and Iran as its major charges in the region and
saw Afghanistan as a buffer state already too far under Soviet influence to merit much
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attention. Poor relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan and continued aid from the
Soviets also made US officials leery of giving more aid to Afghanistan.
Though the Afghan government’s entreaties for U.S. aid to help implement
development programs did not inspire the United States to give aid to Afghanistan,
increased aid from the Soviets did. In response to increases in Soviet aid, the United
States began distributing some technical and economic assistance of its own. Much of
this assistance focused on the betterment of Afghan infrastructure, aviation, education,
and food production. Projects ranged from loans for the purchase of airplanes to grants
for colleges in the United States that would send teachers to Afghan schools. All told, the
US gave some $533 million in aid to Afghanistan between 1955 and 1978 (Johnson 2004,
21). Though 71 percent of this assistance was given in grant form (Rasanayagam 2003,
56), this number pales in comparison to the $2.52 billion donated by the USSR in the
same time frame (Johnson 2004, 21).
Not only did the amount of U.S. aid given to Afghanistan pale in comparison to
Soviet aid, so did the projects implemented with United States funding. According to
historian Jeffery J. Roberts, “American programs continued to neglect the private sector,
took too long to mature, and remained less noticeable and thus less influential than Soviet
projects” (Roberts 2003, 208). A good example of this phenomenon was the Qandahar
International Airport for which funds were approved in 1956. Though funding had been
approved, it took another year for a construction contract for the airport to be signed and
still another year for construction on the airport to begin. By the time construction was
finally finished in 1962, the airport was rendered useless by jet technology that
eliminated the need for it as a stopover point, the initial motivation for its construction.
As a result of its untimely completion, the Qandahar Airport remained unused until the
1980s when the Soviets turned it into an airbase from which to attack the mujahideen
(Ibid.).
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However, the misuse of US economic funding in Afghanistan was already
underway long before the Qandahar International Airport project was conceived. During
the late 1940s and 1950s, the majority of United States funding to Afghanistan was
directed towards the Helmand River Valley Project. This undertaking began in 1946
when the Afghan government contracted the Morrison-Knudson Company of Boise,
Idaho to construct two dams and a number of canals in the Helmand and Arghandab
River Valleys and to train Afghan workers in the maintenance and supply functions of the
new architecture. The money originally allotted for construction was quickly exhausted
and soon Afghanistan’s foreign exchange surplus was lost to Morrison-Knudson and
Pakistani “entrepreneurs” involved in the project (Ibid., 165). When the Afghan
government approached the U.S. in 1949 with requests for funding to undertake a number
of development projects, the U.S. ignored pleas for all aid except that used for the
Helmand River Valley Project. However, even the $21 million loan the United States
approved for this venture was given at a very high interest rate, ensuring the Afghan
government would incur considerable debt through its use (Ibid., 166).
An increase in Afghanistan’s debt was not the only result of the exclusive support
the United States gave the Helmand Project. The United States’ obvious partiality to the
project, and, in turn, Morrison-Knudson soon led the Afghans to believe the US
government was only concerned with ensuring the profits of American businesses (Ibid.,
167). The damage done by this belief was increased by the problems the Helmand River
Valley Project created including increased soil salination, the displacement of 1,300
nomads and peasant farmers, and the loss of foreign exchange surpluses (Clement 2003,
108). Even after years of work and the use of considerable amounts of funding, the
Helmand River Valley Project created more new problems than positive returns.
Though the United States aid funding was often misused and less helpful than
Soviet aid, the Afghan government still relied on it to maintain economic stability.
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During the 1960s, more than forty percent of Afghanistan’s state revenues were derived
from foreign aid (Dorronsoro 2005, 63). This reliance proved highly detrimental to the
country when both the United States and the Soviet Union, by far the country’s two
largest aid donors, began to curtail aid programs to Afghanistan in the late 1960s. The
loss of foreign funds this curtailment spawned created an increasingly stagnant Afghan
economy. During 1970 and 1971, a drought and famine exacerbated the economic
trouble, bringing about the death of an estimated 100,000 people and devastating
livestock (Roberts 2003, 211).
Despite some increases in aid flows from the United States in 1972 and 1973, by
1978 Afghanistan’s economic and social indicators were the worst in the world. Almost
the entire rural population was without electricity, there was one doctor for every 16,000
Afghans, and 80% of these medics resided in Kabul (Rasanayagam 2003, 56). Health
indicators were not the only that suffered. The numbers for education were also shocking
with 76% of Afghan children receiving no formal education and the Afghan population’s
literacy rate ranking 127th in the world (Ibid., 57).
Despite the horrible conditions in Afghanistan, United States economic aid to the
country decreased during the late 1970s due to a period of détente in the cold war
(Dorronsoro 2005, 65). However, this period of decreased aid did not last long. The end
of the 1970s heralded a complete transformation in the United States’ aid relationship
with Afghanistan. This change was inspired by the rise of the PDPA to power in 1977
and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that followed. The emergence of a staunchly
communist government in Afghanistan backed by Soviet troops led to a new emphasis on
military aid to the only truly organized opposition group in the country, the mujahideen.
The beginning of support for the mujahideen was simultaneous with the end of United
States economic aid to the Afghan government. Though aid donations to the government
were curtailed from 1980 to 1984, they were not absent for the entire decade. The
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extreme devastation caused by Soviet tactics inspired many in the international
community to provide funding to Afghanistan. Beginning in 1986 the United States also
stepped in and renewed donations to the Afghan government in the form of food aid
(Standard Country Report: Afghanistan, 2005).
Food aid remained the dominant form of United States economic assistance to the
Afghan government through the rest of the conflict between the communists and the
mujahideen in the 1980s and during the civil war that followed in the 1990s (Ibid.).
Though these donations did address the fall in agricultural output Afghanistan
experienced as a result of the war, they did little to address the deterioration of Afghan
infrastructure and social systems caused by the fighting. By the early 1990s, about sixty
percent of Afghan schools had no building, the road system had deteriorated
dramatically, and irrigation systems were greatly damaged (Maley 2002, 156). Clearly,
post-war Afghanistan retained few of the positive effects economic assistance from the
United States before the war had yielded and in many ways the country was far worse off
than it had been before aid from the United States had begun.

Military funding: Maintaining the mujahideen
As one US official noted, ‘our objectives weren’t peace and grooviness in
Afghanistan, our objective was killing commies and getting the Russians out’
(Lansford 2003, 144).

After World War II, the United States, seeing the dissolution of traditional British
power in South Asia as a potential security threat, began looking for allies to counteract
Soviet influence in the region. Though Afghanistan presented itself early on as an
interested party, the United States’ fear that the country could be easily influenced by the
Soviet Union led it to refuse repeated requests from the Afghan government for military
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aid. Despite continued entreaties and the decision to give economic aid to the Afghan
government, the United States continued to withhold military contributions. This
decision increased Afghan military dependence on the Soviet Union and eventually led to
the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops in 1979. As a result of this invasion,
military aid donations from the United States began to find their way into Afghanistan to
support the mujahideen Islamist groups who were fighting the Soviet-backed communist
regime. Throughout the mujahideen’s battle with the Soviets, the United States remained
one of the primary donors of military aid and equipment. Though the United States
remained heavily involved in donating aid to the mujahideen, its involvement in
distributing this aid was minimal. Instead of distributing aid directly, the United States
delivered aid through Pakistan, which increased the severity of leaks in the weapons
supply pipeline. In addition to inundating the region with weaponry, United States
assistance to the mujahideen also allowed the resistance groups to lengthen the span of
their war against the Soviets. The lengthening of the struggle did little to encourage the
stabilization of the Afghan government and left many Afghans dead or injured and still
more completely uprooted from their homes.
Though the United States did not formally recognize Afghanistan until 1934, the
country’s requests for military aid began in the 1940s (Roberts 2003, 165). From the
beginning, these requests were ignored. Despite the U.S. governments’ consistent lack of
interest in Afghanistan, there were some experts on the issue who believed the United
States should reconsider its position. In 1954, Chester Bowles, the former ambassador to
India, argued against neglecting Afghanistan while giving arms aid to Pakistan because
this move would ‘almost certainly result in [Afghanistan’s] acceptance of military aid and
economic assistance’ from the Soviet Union, which would foster increased penetration of
the Afghan state (Ibid., 154). Despite these warnings, the United States gave increasing
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amounts of support to Pakistan, one of Afghanistan’s major political rivals, while
continuing to ignore Afghan pleas for aid.
As the United States made decisions that pushed Afghanistan away, the Soviet
Union’s choices ensured its relationship with Afghanistan grew stronger. Between 1955
and 1972 Afghanistan received nearly ½ billion dollars of military aid from the USSR.
This amounted to 95% of Afghanistan’s total military aid during this period and included
MiG-17 fighters, IL-28 light bombers, T-34 tanks, howitzers, and armored personnel
carriers (Ibid., 206). Though the United States feared Afghanistan would use weapons
against U.S. interests in South Asia, these fears proved to be unfounded. Instead of
creating a pro-communist state in Afghanistan, increased military assistance gave the
military enough strength to implement the Afghan government’s development programs
(Ibid., 207). Though the Afghan government did not actively use Soviet military aid to
the detriment of U.S. interests in South Asia, increased arms supplies from the Soviets
did influence the power structure of the region by increasing Afghanistan’s dependence
on the Soviets for military repairs (Ibid., 207).
Despite Afghanistan’s growing reliance on the Soviets, military aid to the country
from the United States continued to be virtually non-existent. However, all this changed
when Soviet troops entered Afghanistan in 1979. From this point on, the United States
began to supply the Afghan group fighting the communists, the mujahideen, with both
overt and covert military aid. Though a significant portion of the military aid given to the
mujahideen during the decade was covert, the aid figures given by scholars are fairly
consistent. According to the figures given by Larry P. Goodson, which can be found in
their entirety in graph 2, the total amount of covert military aid given by the United States
to the mujahideen during the 1980s is somewhere between $2.45 and $2.7 billion
(Goodson 2001, 146). Though aid donations began small, they grew consistently until
they reached a high of $600 million in 1987 (Ibid.). The quality of weapons sent to the
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mujahideen during this time period also improved from assault rifles, machine guns, 82mm mortars and SAM-7 missiles in the early 1980s to Swiss Oerlikon 20-mm antiaircraft guns, 107-mm multi-barreled rocket launchers, and U.S. Redeye and Stinger
missiles in the mid-1980s (Ibid.). Though the aid the United States distributed to the
mujahideen evolved over the course of the conflict, the means of distribution did not.
United States’ aid to the mujahideen was funneled through Pakistan throughout the
1980s. This single factor gave birth to some of the most negative effects United States
military funding to the mujahideen would create.
Initially, distributing aid through Pakistan simply limited funding to the
mujahideen due to fears that higher amounts of aid would encourage the Soviets to
retaliate against Pakistan for its role in aid distribution (Ibid., 145). However, soon a
much more lasting effect became obvious. Throughout the 1980s a large discrepancy
between the amounts of weapons purchased for the mujahideen and the amount the
soldiers actually received pointed to a leak in the arms distribution pipeline. Where these
leaks originated was impossible for the United States to determine as the CIA only
controlled the first leg of the route, during which weapons were purchased and sent to
Pakistan (Rasanayagam 2003, 112). After this leg, the weapons still had to pass through
Pakistan to the different mujahideen commanders on the Afghan border and then on to
soldiers on the battlefield (Ibid.). Allegations of weapons being stolen or diverted on this
journey were widespread, with estimates of the amount of aid that leaked out of the
pipeline ranging from 20 to 85 percent of that donated (Goodson 2001, 144-145). With
the severity of weapons leaks uncertain, it is difficult to determine the impact they had on
Afghanistan. However, weapons leaks surely increased instability by generally
improving access to advanced weaponry and ensuring that numerous factions within
Afghanistan remained well armed.
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Of course, the impact of U.S. funding to the mujahideen was not completely
dictated by the decision to deliver aid through Pakistan. Much of the lasting physical
effects created by U.S. assistance were derived from the contributions U.S. funding made
to the mujahideens’ ability to keep fighting the Soviets. Instead of the easy victory the
Soviets were expecting, U.S. aid made it possible for the war to go on for an entire
decade. Though this allowed the mujahideen to rid Afghanistan of Soviet occupation, it
also deepened the wounds left by war. Over the course of the war two million Afghans
died, millions more were wounded and over half the population became refugees
(Roberts 2003, 231). In the period between 1978 and 1987 alone, 876, 825 unnatural
deaths occurred in Afghanistan - an average death rate of over 240 deaths every day for
ten years straight (Maley 2002, 154). Despite the size of these figures, the number of
refugees created by the war far eclipsed the number of people killed or injured by it.
Since 1979 more than 6 million people have fled from Afghanistan, making Afghan
refugees the largest single population of displaced people in the world (Johnson 2004,
66). Despite the brutal destabilizing results of the Soviet-Afghan war, final U.S. funding
did virtually nothing to help the situation and “little attempt was made to focus U.S.
energy and aid either on creating the conditions and mechanisms for ensuring a relatively
bloodless transfer of power to the Mujahideen, or in catering for the Afghans’
humanitarian needs during a transitional phase” (Saikal 2004, 205). With no help in
creating stability forthcoming and no single group among the mujahideen able to obtain
enough support within Afghanistan to gain control of the government, the country
descended into another decade of struggle.
As struggle for control of the government continued in the 1990s, the bulk of the
Afghan population endeavored to return their lives to normal. However, the lingering
effects of the Soviet-Afghan war made this feat impossible. When the refugee population
began its slow migration back into Afghanistan they discovered a civil war in progress
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that continued to displace many people within the country. Families trying to escape the
fighting left their homes, drastically changing the traditional distribution of Afghanistan’s
population. In addition to changing traditional population distribution, the refugee crisis
has diminished human capital formation, helping increase the potential for a cycle of
conflict because “it is often easier to train unskilled youths to fight than to farm” (Maley
2002, 155).
The refugee crisis is not the only lingering effect of the struggle between the
Soviets and the mujahideen. Afghanistan also continues to cope with the weapons that
remain on its soil as a result of the war. Recent estimates put the number of Stinger
missiles still unaccounted for in the country somewhere between 50 and 70 (Katzman
2004, 37) and land mines are a prevalent and dangerous feature of the country’s
topography. Each month between 150 and 300 people are killed or injured by the 5 to 7
million landmines still left on Afghan soil (Johnson 2004, 38). Though the United States
military support of the mujahideen succeeded in ending the Soviet threat to Afghanistan,
it also ensured the Afghan population would continue to be threatened by the legacy of
violence, extremism, and conflict the Soviet-Afghan War left behind.

Benign neglect?
Through its funding of the mujahideen in the Soviet-Afghan war, the United
States “created both a generation of Afghan and foreign born fighters with
extensive combat experience and an atmosphere of activism and radicalism
which was initially directed at the USSR, but whose wrath would later be
broadened to include the West in general” (Lansford 2003, 5).

The United States attitude towards Afghanistan immediately following World
War II was one of aloofness. For many years the United States ignored Afghanistan’s
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frequent requests for military and development assistance. On the few occasions the
United States agreed to give aid to the Afghan government, these packages were
accompanied by a number of extreme stipulations including astronomical interest rates
and policy agreements that reflected little knowledge of Afghanistan’s needs or the power
dynamics in South Asia. Despite the requirements that accompanied agreements for the
donation of aid to Afghanistan, the United States remained primarily uninterested in
Afghanistan’s government and policies from 1946 to 1979. During this time, the United
States’ disregard for Afghanistan not only limited its development options, it also forced
the country to turn to the Soviets for help. Increased aid from the Soviets soon led to
Afghan dependence on the country and increased political power for communist
movements within Afghan politics. However, even this growing connection eluded the
United States until the Soviets began to prepare for invasion of Afghanistan.
With invasion looming on the horizon, the United States jumped into action by
throwing its support behind the mujahideen resistance. However, the United States’
complete lack of knowledge concerning the true issues facing Afghanistan once again led
to the encouragement of incredibly negative policies. Rather than becoming actively
involved in the distribution of funds to the mujahideen, the United States allowed
Pakistan to determine which factions would receive the largest sums of American aid.
The requirements Pakistan used to distribute aid to the mujahideen ensured that Islamic
fundamentalism within Afghanistan grew while no single faction of the mujahideen
developed enough strength to present a viable alternative to the communist government
after Soviet withdrawal. As a result, the removal of Soviet troops in 1989 left both a
weak communist government in Kabul and a fragmented opposition in the rural areas of
the country. Instead of encouraging the growth of an alternative government, U.S.
assistance to the mujahideen simply discredited the Soviets and ensured continued
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fighting among the mujahideen would continue to devastate the Afghan population
throughout the 1990s.
Though the United States refused to give aid to Afghanistan, this did not mean the
United States completely ignored the country. In 1946, the Morrison-Knudson company
began the Helmand River Valley Project, which the United States government would
later help support. However, support for the Helmand River project was not only offered
at high interest rates, but also instead of funding for other development goals with which
the Afghan government approached the United States (Roberts 2003, 166). In addition to
ignoring requests for broad development goals while offering loans for projects
undertaken by American companies, the United States also responded to Afghan
entreaties for a stronger relationship between the two nations with a four-year trade
agreement beginning in 1950. However, much like loans given for the Helmand River
Valley Project, this trade agreement did not denote trust or interest in the Afghan
government’s policies. This fact was made abundantly clear when, one year after making
the agreement, the United States suspended it until the Afghan government signed a
bilateral Mutual Security Act (Clements 2003, 291).
Though much of the United States’ interaction with Afghanistan seemed to be
dictated by its fears of the Soviet relationship with the South Asian country, the true
driving force behind the United States’ relationship with the country was a complete lack
of knowledge. Despite the fact that leaders in Afghanistan were ready to begin
modernizing and would have gladly stood with the U.S. against the Soviets in the event
of Soviet invasion, the United States remained “convinced that extensive involvement in
Afghanistan would merely provide the Soviets with a pretext for action while
overburdening the Afghan budget” (Roberts 2003, 186). Due to these unfounded fears,
the United States refused to make the type of alliance Afghanistan sought, pushing the
country to deepen its relationship with the Soviets.
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Despite its fears that increased aid would encourage Soviet action in Afghanistan,
the United States did give aid to the country. However, to say the US government
remained extremely uninvolved in Afghanistan and had little working knowledge of the
effects its policies had would be an understatement. In fact, US observation of
Afghanistan was so lax that the United States continued to fund the Afghan government
after the Saur Revolution because no CIA operatives or intelligence officials were aware
the new leaders the revolution brought to power were, in fact, communists (Lansford
2003, 119). Despite this snafu, the United States recovered from their error in judgment
quickly and by 1980 had begun a program of wholehearted military support for the
mujahideen resistance groups fighting the PDPA.
Though the United States began supporting the mujahideen resistance groups in
the 1980s, its knowledge of the inner workings of Afghan politics remained minimal.
Instead of giving money and weapons to the mujahideen directly, the United States chose
to distribute funding through Pakistan. As a result, once weapons and money were turned
over to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Service, the United States became
blissfully unconcerned with the path aid took to reach the mujahideen. This made the ISI
completely responsible for determining distribution policies for United States aid.
Despite the United States trust of Pakistan and Pakistan’s long-standing alliance with the
United States, the country did not consider U.S. interests when selecting the factions of
the mujahideen that would receive aid. Instead, Pakistan’s ISI distributed the most aid to
mujahideen groups with ‘weak links to the local society, educated commanders, and
ideological proximity to the ISI’ (Maley 2002, 75). These criterion not only accentuated
the tensions between mujahideen groups (Ibid.), they also ensured mujahideen factions
that practiced a more extremist fundamental version of Islam received more aid (Rubin
1995, 35). In this way, radical practitioners of Islam prospered while moderates were
slowly pushed out of the spectrum. Because the ISI required all refugees to be affiliated
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with one of the many mujahideen groups in order to receive assistance, their distribution
of U.S. funding not only impacted the version of Islam practiced by the mujahideen, it
also impacted the version practiced by Afghan refugees (Clement 2003, 121). As a result
of their forced affiliation with one of the mujahideen factions selected by the ISI, the
refugees’ exposure to radical versions of Islam increased. This not only encouraged the
spread of these interpretations through gradual indoctrination but also through forced
acceptance.
Despite the negative effects aid distribution through Pakistan created, the United
States continued sending assistance to the mujahideen through the country. However,
extensive aid for the mujahideen did not completely rid Afghanistan of communism.
When the Soviet soldiers withdrew in 1989 they left a communist government in control
of Kabul. Soon both the United States and the USSR lessened aid contributions to
Afghanistan until they ceased completely in 1992. Though continued aid flows from the
United States and the USSR no longer affected Afghanistan’s political scene, the effects
of aid distribution during the conflict remained. Soviet aid allowed the remnants of the
PDPA to maintain some control over Afghanistan even after Soviet withdrawal, but this
control was lost in 1990 when the country descended into all out civil war. Soon the
various factions of the mujahideen and the government in exile all began fighting the
communist government for power over the country. Though the mujahideen forces
finally gained control of the Afghan government in 1992, the aid distribution policies
Pakistan had enacted during the Soviet-Afghan war ensured no single group had enough
power to gain the support of the Afghan population. Consequently, fighting continued
throughout Afghanistan for the next decade, exacerbating the negative effects extended
warfare in the country had already created.
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Blinded by fear, blindsided by reality

Afghanistan is doubtless the most fanatic, hostile country in the world
today… There is no pretense of according Christians equal rights with
Moslems. There are no banks in Afghanistan…[The Afghans] detest
taxation and military service and welcome chaos and confusion which
enables them to do…as they see fit on helpless communities and passing
caravans…No foreign lives in the country can be protected and no foreign
interests guaranteed. - Wallace Smith Murray, Chief of the State
Department’s Division of Near Eastern Affairs in 1930 (Roberts 2003, 161)

As Wallace Smith Murray’s vivid description of Afghanistan demonstrates, early
images of the country held by the United States were less than flattering. Afghanistan
was not only seen as a lawless land but also as a country that would quickly fall under
Soviet domination. This view of Afghanistan greatly impacted the United States’ foreign
assistance policy to South Asia following World War II. Motivated by fear of what
might happen if the United States agreed to aid Afghanistan or encouraged it to
participate in a regional security alliance, the United States ignored the country during the
early post-World War II period. In fact, Afghanistan was completely omitted from
foreign policy plans in South Asia. Unfortunately, the view of Afghanistan as a
barbarous state ripe for Soviet infiltration failed to incorporate a number of crucial facts
about the country including Afghanistan’s history of opposition to the Russians and
communism, the Afghan government’s desire to modernize and maintain friendship with
the United States, and the country’s prime location within South Asia. Ignoring these key
facts in favor of maintaining old prejudices about Afghanistan caused the United States to
remain preoccupied with security threats it perceived Afghanistan posed to South Asia
and prevented it from seeing the security threat its own aid policies were creating. As a
result, the United States was blindsided by real security threats, such as the Soviet
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invasion of Afghanistan and the growth of Al’Qaeda, which arose as a result of its own
aid policies in Afghanistan.
The first fact the United States ignored about Afghanistan was the country’s long
history of opposition to the Russians. This opposition found its roots in traditional
struggles for independence from the larger country, but was reborn in new forms during
the 20th century. In the 1930s Afghanistan’s ruling dynasty “restricted Soviet activities in
Afghanistan, banned all communist and communist-affiliated parties, and persecuted
known sympathizers” (Roberts 2003, 185).

Afghanistan also “kept Soviet diplomats

under constant surveillance and even prohibited communist embassies from distributing
materials in any language native to Afghanistan, thereby insulating the population from
propaganda” (Ibid., 186). Even when the United States’ refusals of aid forced
Afghanistan to turn towards the Soviets for support, the Afghan government made a
conscious effort to minimize the influence the Soviets gained over the country by
assigning Soviet-trained officers to less sensitive posts (Ibid., 209). Afghan leaders also
tried to counter Soviet influence by maintaining ties with a number of other great powers
(Saikal 2004, 124). These ties were meant to ensure the government would not be
completely reliant on the Soviets, their equipment or Soviet-trained Afghans sympathetic
to their cause.
Due to its position as the Soviet Union’s main rival, the most crucial of the other
great powers the Afghan government attempted to maintain ties with was the United
States. Through out the post-World War II era the Afghan government demonstrated an
intense desire for friendship with the US. In fact, the country continued to court U.S. aid
and approval year after year despite the cool response it received from the United States.
Afghan interest in bettering relations with the United States was not only a result of
efforts to balance out the influence of the Soviets, it also originated from a true desire to
modernize the country. As the most underdeveloped nation in South Asia (Roberts 2003,

Kersey 40
184), Afghanistan saw foreign assistance as the key to development (Saikal 2004, 121).
The country also viewed a strong alliance with the United States and the internal
development this alliance would surely bring, as a solution to the threat increased reliance
on the Soviets would pose.
Some American officials also saw an alliance between Afghanistan and the
United States as an appropriate measure to curtail Soviet influence in the region. These
South Asian experts within the State Department put forth the argument that the
“successful defense of the subcontinent would require joint action by Pakistan, India and
Afghanistan” (Roberts 2003, 136). Despite the presence of this viewpoint within the
State Department, Afghanistan remained absent from the United States’ plans to
encourage the growth of collective security pacts in the region. Instead of choosing
Afghanistan, which was ideally located to shield the United States’ other major allies in
the region, Pakistan and Iran, from Soviet invasion, the United States chose to fund Syria,
Turkey, and Iraq (Ibid., 149). To add insult to injury, the United States attached no
strategic importance to Afghanistan and routinely dismissed the country’s concerns as
inconsequential (Ibid., 155).
Though Afghanistan never gave up its efforts to garner U.S. support, the
continuous negative response it received from the United States led the country to feel
increasingly isolated from the West. The United States’ fear that Afghanistan would
become a pawn of the Soviet Union would soon be realized, not because of a growing
desire in Afghanistan to ally with the Soviets but because of Afghanistan’s growing
alienation from the West (Ibid., 193). This alienation forced Afghanistan’s leader,
Mohammed Daoud, to choose “between continued economic stagnation, military
impotence, and political frustration or rapprochement with the Soviet Union” (Roberts
2003, 194). In this way, “Washington’s spurning of Daoud entailed serious
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consequences, leading eventually to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan more than two
decades later” (Saikal 2004, 122).
It took the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan for the United States to interpret events
in the country as important to U.S. national security and containment policy. However,
the United States awareness that politics in Afghanistan could alter the security of South
Asia only lasted as long as the Soviet-Afghan war. By 1992, Afghanistan was once again
forgotten by the United States and suffering through a wrenching combination of postwar turmoil and civil war. It was during this time period that new threats to the United
States’ national security emerged as a result of the United States’ policies during the
Soviet-Afghan War. These threats took the form of terrorist Osama bin Laden and the
group Al’Qaeda, which he controlled. Bin Laden was one of the Arab fighters who had
come to Afghanistan during the Afghan-Soviet conflict to fight in the jihad. As a result
of his opposition to the Soviets, Bin Laden benefited from US weapons and other military
aid provided to the mujahideen in the 1980s. However, when the jihad against the
Soviets ended, Bin Laden, like many other Arab soldiers who had come to fight in
Afghanistan, set his sights on other battles.
Though he was similar in motive and past experience to many other Muslim
Arabs who fought in Afghanistan, Bin Laden was also a man apart. Instead of
accompanying other former mujahideen soldiers to Bosnia, Chechnya, Algeria, Egypt or
Somalia to continue the jihad, Bin Laden chose to create and maintain his own network
of veteran mujahideen. Though international pressure forced him to remain mobile
during the early 1990s, by May 1996 Bin Laden had returned his base of operations to
Afghanistan. Here, in a country that was both forgotten and neglected by the United
States and still in the final stages of civil war, Bin Laden was able to prepare a network of
operatives who would dedicate their lives to wreaking havoc on the non-Muslim world
by any means possible (Shay 2002, 138-139). The rise of the Taliban government in
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Afghanistan provided Bin Laden with an important ally and ensured Afghanistan would
remain his base of operations through the rest of the 1990s. With a safe haven
established, Bin Laden began inciting violent activity in 1998 by calling on all Muslims
to kill United States citizens and their allies. Attempts to make good on these threats
quickly followed with the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August
1998. As a result of these attacks, the United States bombed Bin Laden’s training camps
near Khost with cruise missiles (Clement 2003, 320).
Though the bombings of US embassies in Africa garnered an immediate reaction,
they did not facilitate the creation of policy to address the threat Osama Bin Laden,
Al’Qaeda, and the Taliban posed. Rather, they began a long and useless battle of words
with the Taliban over the presence of Bin Laden and other Al’Qaeda operatives within
Afghanistan. The bombing of the USS Cole off the coast of Yemen in October 2000,
which the US also suspected Bin Laden and Al’Qaeda masterminded, brought with it
another effort from the United States’ government to force the Taliban to extradite Bin
Laden. However, these efforts once again fell short and Bin Laden remained free.
Despite the amazing amount of money the United States and the Soviet Union
pumped into Afghanistan in the second half of the 20th century, Afghanistan remains one
of the poorest countries in the world. It is impossible to ignore the contribution that US
and Soviet intervention in the 1980s made to the current issues Afghanistan is struggling
against. The instability and conflict the country suffered during the Soviet occupation
and the subsequent years of civil war demolished any positive effects that could have
been gained from US and Soviet aid prior to the conflict. Years of war killed, injured, or
uprooted much of the Afghan population, inundated the country with weapons and
landmines, and radicalized and fragmented political groups.
The attitude the United States approached Afghanistan with also had a major
impact on the outcome of events in the country. Instead of truly examining the power
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relationship within South Asia and making educated aid policy decisions based on facts,
the United States allowed an outdated image of Afghanistan and fear of perceived
security threats to influence their foreign policy. As a result, the United States succeeded
in creating the situation it desperately hoped to avoid: a Soviet invasion of South Asia.
Despite the obvious lessons the United States could have learned from its own
mistakes, the end of the Soviet-Afghan war also ended U.S. interest in aiding
Afghanistan. The United States remained relatively unconcerned with events taking
place in Afghanistan as the mujahideen failed to create a stable government and the
country dissolved into civil war. The lack of stability in Afghanistan, the emergence of a
strong Muslim fundamentalist movement and the prevalence of weapons in the region all
contributed to the conditions that allowed Osama Bin Laden and his terrorist network to
grow in Afghanistan. These factors not only created a new, and very real, security threat
they also emerged from aid policy decisions the United States made based on the
perceived security threat the Afghan government posed. The United States’
misinterpretation of politics in South Asia led it to make aid policy choices that both
encouraged Soviet invasion and created a spirit of radical Muslim fundamentalism. The
growth of Al’Qaeda in Afghanistan and the country’s decent into civil war at the close of
the 20th century were just the beginning of the effects Afghanistan and the United States
would be forced to contend with as a result of United States foreign aid policy in the
second half of the 20th century.

U.S. foreign assistance policy in Nicaragua
A brief history

Compared to the history of the United States’ relations with Afghanistan, the
history of US relations with Nicaragua is quite long and complex. From the time the
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country’s Spanish colonizers departed Nicaragua in the 1820s, the United States stepped
in to fill the void left by the colonial power. The United States arbitrated disputes
between warring political factions, invested in the economy, and agreed to protect
Nicaragua from other powers. When political upheaval began in earnest in the early
1900s, the United States sent Marines to keep peace in the country. As a result of the
Marines’ occupation and Nicaragua’s dependence on U.S. support, U.S. troops remained
the only military presence in Nicaragua for much of the early 1900s. However, lessening
support from citizens of the United States for maintaining a military presence in
Nicaragua led the Marines to begin making plans for their departure. Central to these
plans was the creation and training of a new Nicaraguan national army, the National
Guard, that would take over the job of maintaining peace in the country following
national elections and the withdrawal of the Marines in 1933.
Unfortunately, three years after the Marines’ departure, U.S. hopes that the
National Guard would help maintain a stable democratically elected government in
Nicaragua were dashed when Anastasio Somoza Garciá, the commander-in-chief of the
military, used the armed forces to take over the Nicaraguan government. By the end of
1936, Somoza had run for the presidency unopposed and changed the Nicaraguan
constitution to lengthen his presidential term until May 1947. In addition to changing the
constitution, Somoza took other steps to ensure his power over Nicaragua was secure.
The first was to ensure his control over Nicaragua was comprehensive. In order
to accomplish this feat, Somoza made personal investments in all sectors of the
Nicaraguan economy and took control of the judicial system, radio, telegraph, postal
service, health services, railroad and internal revenue service. This control not only gave
him the ability to pull strings in the economy, but also to determine the outcome of legal
events and even how news in Nicaragua was reported. Though Somoza had gained
control of many sectors of Nicaragua, he still required some semblance of legitimacy to
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gain true control over the Nicaraguan people. In order to gain this legitimacy, Somoza
insinuated his regime received the backing of the U.S. government. This tactic, which
the Somoza regime would continue to use to its advantage for the duration of its rule,
played on the faith the Nicaraguan people had in the judgments made by the U.S.
government.
Despite Somoza’s indications otherwise, no real approval for the dictator had
been given by the United States. In fact, by 1950 the United States had begun to
encourage the dictator to allow elections to take place in Nicaragua. Though elections
did occur, Somoza made efforts to subvert them to maintain his position of power and
when these efforts failed, he forcibly regained control of the country. In addition to the
plotting Somoza facilitated to regain power in his own country in the 1950s, he also
facilitated plots to overthrow the Costa Rican government. By the time he was
assassinated in 1956, the United States was no longer recognizing the Nicaraguan
government.
Anastasio Somoza’s assassination by no means brought the Somoza era to an end
in Nicaragua. Instead, it simply transformed the military dictatorship into a military
dynasty. Upon their father’s death, Somoza’s two sons, Luis Somoza Debayle and
Anastasio Somoza Debayle, began running the country together. The brothers each
ascended to a position of power with Luis occupying the presidency while Anastasio took
over as the commander-in-chief of the National Guard. As president, Luis Somoza
Debayle restored many civil liberties and the constitutional ban on reelection. Luis’s
time in office brought hopes of change in Nicaragua, but health issues prevented him
from maintaining his position of power. From 1963 to 1967 trusted friends of the
Somoza family assumed the presidency in Luis’s stead, maintaining many of the positive
changes he had enacted during his own time in office. However, these changes would
not last.
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In 1967, Luis suffered a fatal heart attack and Anastasio used his position as
commander-in-chief of the National Guard to gain the presidency. Anastasio was a much
more corrupt and brutal ruler than both his father and his older brother. He abandoned
the movements towards political freedom his brother had begun and often resorted to
using force to maintain his position of power. In 1971 Anastasio Somoza Debayle forced
the Nicaraguan congress to dissolve itself and the constitution, effectively giving the
dictator complete control over the country. The new dictator also did his best to profit
from the control he gained over Nicaragua. When an earthquake devastated the country
in 1972, destroying most of Managua and leaving thousands homeless and jobless,
Somoza Debayle placed international humanitarian aid given to the Nicaraguan
government for earthquake relief into his own private bank accounts.
In the next six years of his rule, Somoza Debayle continued to make decisions
that fueled the growth of opposition against him. After winning a landslide victory in a
clearly rigged election in 1974, Anastasio declared a state of siege in Nicaragua. During
this state of siege, Somoza Debayle instituted full censorship of the press and sent the
National Guard on a campaign to squash opposition groups throughout the country
(Walker 1985, 23). Between January 1975 and January 1978 the National Guard killed
an estimated 3,000 persons (Gómez 2003, 162). Though the continued violence against
the Nicaraguan people was intended to end their support for the opposition it had the
opposite effect. By 1978 many opposition groups had begun to band together in an effort
to make change. The traditional conservative party of Nicaragua, and four other groups
opposed to the Somoza dictatorship: Udel, Los Doce, the Movimiento Democrático
Nicaragüenese, and the Unión Democrática de Liberación, joined to form the Frente
Amplio de Oposición (FAO) and began an effort to negotiate with Anastasio.
While the FAO attempted to negotiate, violence continued. The National Guard
attempted to retake cities lost to rebel control and even went so far as to bomb major
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civilian centers in October, leaving some 25,000 people homeless (Ibid.). By the end of
1978 the Nicaraguan people were tired of waiting for changes in their government and
continued efforts by the FAO to negotiate for Somoza Debayle’s resignation were going
nowhere. With Anastasio insisting on remaining in power until 1981, more and more
Nicaraguans began turning towards the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN
or Sandinistas) for answers.
Founded in 1961 by a group of highly nationalistic student activists who were
morally repelled by Somoza and troubled by social conditions in Nicaragua, the
Sandinistas had advocated violent revolution from the beginning (Walker 1985, 5).
During the 1960s their guerilla forces were repeatedly destroyed, but this did not prevent
them from winning crucial victories against Somoza Debayle in the 1970s. These
victories were won through successful hostage-ransom situations in 1974 and 1978 in
which the Sandinistas were able to force Somoza Debayle to free political prisoners, give
them money, and allow them to make announcements about their cause through the
Nicaraguan media. By 1978, with negotiations between the FAO and Somoza Debayle
stagnating, the FSLN, their successes against Somoza Debayle, and their growing
military strength became an attractive solution to removing the dictator from power. By
1979 support for the FSLN from other opposition groups had increased as had weapons
flows from Venezuela, Panama, Cuba, and Costa Rica. With this increased internal and
external support, the Sandinistas stepped up their efforts to wrest control of Nicaragua
from Somoza Debayle and were finally successful. By the middle of 1979 Anastasio Jr.
was isolated to Managua and a five-member junta had begun meeting in Costa Rica to
make plans for a new Nicaraguan government.
On July 17, 1979, Anastasio Somoza Debayle resigned and the five-member junta
took over the government of Nicaragua. Though the new government brought the hope
of change and betterment, improving Nicaragua would not be an easy task. During the
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battle between Somoza Debayle and the Sandinistas, Nicaragua had lost two percent of
its population (Ibid., 22). In addition to this loss of life, the new government also
inherited a debt of US$1.6 billion, 120,000 exiles, and 600,000 homeless (Merrill 1994,
38). Exacerbating the economic and social issues facing the junta were political issues.
Early agreements made in Costa Rica began to falter once the junta actually came to
power. Though the group had previously agreed to a mixed economy, political pluralism,
a non-aligned foreign policy, and a new non-partisan army not all of these conditions
were met. Over the next few years, representation within the junta dwindled as members
resigned and FSLN leaders gained more control of the government (Ibid., 38). The
Sandinistas’ forces, which were the only strong military group other than the National
Guard, split to become Nicaragua’s new military and police force, the Sandinista
People’s Army (EPS) and the Sandinista Police. By the mid-1980s, the EPS had become
the biggest and best-equipped army in Central America and the international community
had begun to take notice (Ibid., 41).
The United States’ interest in the Sandinistas originated during the Carter
administration and intensified under Reagan. Though Carter encouraged moderate forces
to negotiate with Somoza Debayle to accomplish a peaceful transfer of power, once the
FSLN forces claimed victory over the dictator, the president attempted to maintain
diplomatic relations with the new government. However, Carter’s efforts were
unsuccessful, and by the time Reagan gained office in 1981, relations between the United
States and the FSLN had cooled considerably. Reagan not only accelerated this trend, he
made removing the Sandinistas from power his primary goal in Nicaragua. To this end,
Reagan began a campaign to isolate the FSLN and create a revolutionary force within
Nicaragua to oppose them.
The force the United States helped create, fund, and train became known as the
contrarevolucionarios, or contras, and the war between them and the FSLN lasted
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throughout the 1980s. U.S. funding of the contras was a controversial issue in both
Nicaragua and the United States from the beginning. While the FSLN and the
Nicaraguan people dealt with the contras origin in remnants of the National Guard and
the destruction they caused with their brutal tactics, citizens of the United States
questioned the morality of U.S. foreign policy and members of Congress squabbled over
the appropriate steps to be taken to remove the Sandinistas from power. By 1984 support
for aiding the contras was so low in the United States that Congress passed the Boland
amendment prohibiting funding to the contras from December 1984 to October 1985
(Robinson 1992, 29). Despite this amendment, the Reagan administration authorized the
CIA to continue contingency funding to the contras throughout the 11 months it was
made illegal. Complicating the matter further, much of the money used to finance the
contras during these months was derived from arms sales to Iran.
The decision to continue funding the contras while the Boland amendment was in
effect created a firestorm for the Reagan administration that came to be known as the
Iran-contra scandal. In addition to the scandal raging in the United States, there was
another controversy related to US behavior in Nicaragua brewing on the international
scene. In March 1984, the CIA and the Navy helped mine Nicaragua’s harbors and in
April the Pentagon sent more than 35,000 troops to international waters off the coast of
Nicaragua to stage military training maneuvers. With seven ships damaged by mines and
their sovereignty clearly violated, the Nicaraguan government appealed to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) for help. Though the ICJ sided with the Nicaraguan
government and insisted the United States stop both the mining and the support of the
contras, this ruling was ignored (Norsworthy 1990, 213-214). The United States’
decision to ignore Nicaragua’s sovereignty, the ICJ and international law led to
considerable outrage from international actors and its own citizens.
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Though scandals damaged the reputation of the United States, the Reagan
administration, and the contras, the United States continued to give the contras non-lethal
funding for the remainder of the 1980s. Non-lethal aid helped keep the contras alive, but
without military aid the Sandinista People’s Army was able to limit the rebels’
destruction to certain areas of Nicaragua. With the contra threat under some semblance
of control, the Sandinistas began their journey on the road towards peace.
In 1987, with help from President Arias of Costa Rica, Nicaragua made peace
with other Central American countries in a treaty that came to be known as Esquipulas II.
The treaty, which was signed by Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and
Nicaragua, called for national reconciliation, an end to external aid, and democratic
reforms leading to free elections in Nicaragua (Merrill 1993, 48). The Sandinistas
adhered to the agreements made in Esquipulas II. Soon after signing they began
negotiations with the contras and agreed to hold elections in 1990. The United States,
seeing a new opportunity to ensure the Sandinistas were removed from power, helped
strengthen and fund the opposition party. The United States’ efforts were successful.
The 1990 election welcomed Violeta Barrios Chamorro to power in Nicaragua and began
a decade of attempted reconstruction for Nicaragua. With their victory over the FSLN
finally won, the United States’ special interest in Nicaragua continued only long enough
to ensure the new government was securely in place.

Failures in economic funding

Despite its role as one of the top recipients of United States funding in Central
America during the 20th century, Nicaragua entered the 21st century as one of the northern
hemisphere’s poorest countries. Fifty percent of the population lives below the poverty
line, the country has an estimated $5.833 billion in external debt, and the unemployment
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rate sits at 22 percent while underemployment is still considerable (CIA, “Nicaragua”
2005). Economic growth is a slow 1.5 to 2.5 percent annual GDP growth rate, much too
low to meet the country’s needs (Ibid.) and though the Nicaraguan government has made
great strides to combat the corruption within it, Nicaragua’s political system remains
fragile.
Many factors, such as years of colonization, unrest in neighboring countries, and a
history full of violence and corruption, have contributed to the creation of Nicaragua’s
current situation but few of these factors did their damage under the guise of doing good.
In contrast, US economic support to the country has always been touted as a gift to aid
economic growth. However, fluctuations in this aid have played a key role in creating
and exacerbating instability in the Nicaraguan economy. US dollars have long had a
substantial impact on Nicaragua. In the early 1900s private investors from the United
States helped begin the development of Nicaraguan businesses and from 1911 until 1959
the U.S. government participated in a customs receivership with Nicaragua (Norsworthy
1990, 211). During the final years of this relationship, growth in the Nicaraguan
economy was above par for the region. Between 1950 and 1960 Nicaragua saw a GDP
growth rate of 6.1 percent per year, the second largest in Central America and well above
the 4 to 5 percent per year experienced in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras (Conroy
1985, 228). Nicaragua’s economic growth continued into the next decade, with
aggregate growth averaging 9.8 percent per year from 1961 to 1968 (Ibid.). Though
Nicaragua’s economy showed impressive growth in the early years of the Somoza
regime, this growth did not necessarily indicate the country had gained economic
independence from the United States. In fact, Nicaragua still depended heavily on US
support to fund the workings of its government, with AID’s funds providing as much as
15 percent of the government’s budget throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Norsworthy
1990, 161).
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Though the Somoza government still depended heavily on US economic aid to
function, it could by no means count on these aid flows to be consistent. Graph 3.A
shows the flows of aid from the United States to Nicaragua from 1946 to 2001. Clearly,
aid flows between 1946 and 1979, when the Somozas controlled Nicaragua, were erratic,
with consistency only emerging towards the end of their rule. Rather than corresponding
with decreases in Nicaraguan dependence on foreign aid or economic and social
development in the country, economic aid flows to Nicaragua corresponded with the
United States’ need for cooperation from the Somozas. Marked increases in economic
aid took place when the Nicaraguan government agreed to cooperate militarily with the
United States to further US interests in Central America in the 1960s. After Luis Somoza
Debayle allowed the Cuban exile brigade to use military bases on the Caribbean coast of
Nicaragua during the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, economic aid from the United
States to Nicaragua jumped from $9.9 million in 1961 to $13.7 million in 1962 (Merrill
1993, 29). Similarly, major drops in economic aid corresponded with the United States
disapproval of actions taken by the dictatorship. Frequently, this disapproval occurred
when the Somoza family’s actions became overtly authoritarian. For example, the drop
in aid from $13.2 million in 1971 to $4.2 million in 1972 followed Anastasio Somoza
Debayle’s efforts to gain complete control over the Nicaraguan government by forcing
the Nicaraguan congress to dissolve itself and the Nicaraguan constitution in 1971.
Fluctuations in economic aid also corresponded with the United States fears of
losing a strong ally in Central America. As the United States became more aware of the
opposition facing the Somoza regime in the last half of the 1970s, the Somozas became
the leading recipient of AID funds in Central America (Norsworthy 1990, 161). Most aid
was explicitly designed to reward the government for remaining Washington’s strongest
ally in Latin America or to support the business elite. (Ibid., 161-162). However, aid also
increased when events in Nicaragua seemed to be escalating too quickly for the Somozas
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to handle. The largest jump in aid during the Somoza years, from $15.5 million to $42.2
million came in 1975, the year after the Sandinistas successfully captured a number of
leading Nicaraguan officials and Somoza relatives. With these hostages, the Sandinistas
were able to negotiate $1 million in ransom, the release of 14 Sandinista prisoners, and a
government declaration read over the radio and printed in Nicaragua’s major newspaper
(Merrill 1993, 32). With their allies humiliated in the face of their rivals, it follows that
the United States would support the Somozas in whatever way possible.
The trend of increasing economic aid in time with the increase of unrest in the
Nicaraguan population continued as opposition to the Somoza regime gained strength.
Figures from USAID show a significant and consistent increase in funds to Nicaragua
beginning in 1977, when Anastasio Somoza Debayle lifted martial law in the country
(Norsworthy 1990, 212). This move, which gave the illusion of loosening authoritarian
rule, came at a time when the United States had begun to pressure the regime to increase
its awareness of human rights. Somoza Debayle’s decision allowed the United States to
increase funding while seeming to stick to its guns about its commitment to human rights.
Though the United States continued to distribute economic funding to the
Somozas, little effort was made to ensure this funding was used to further development in
Nicaragua. Despite the increase of aid in the 1970s, life for most citizens of the country
remained difficult. Nicaraguans faced a life expectancy of 53 years, half the population
was illiterate, and thirty percent of the country’s income went to the richest 5 percent of
income earners (Gilbert 1988, 3). The devastating affects of earthquakes hitting the
country in 1972 also greatly impacted the country. Though international aid donors
acknowledged this impact, the Nicaraguan people never benefited from their generosity.
Instead, Anastasio Somoza Debayle absorbed the humanitarian aid for his own personal
profit.
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Though the United States had continued to give economic aid to the Somoza
dictatorship even when this aid was clearly used by the dictators to increase their profit
and their control over Nicaragua, economic aid was quickly stopped when the Sandinistas
came to power. After a brief and shaky alliance between the Carter administration and
the FSLN, Reagan entered office with the intention of not only ceasing U.S. economic
aid to the Sandinistas but also isolating them from other channels of economic assistance.
This plan started with the suspension of all U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan government on
January 23, 1981(Merrill 1993, 42). Between 1981 and 1984 the Reagan administration
also successfully blocked $400 million in loans and credits approved as bilateral and
multilateral aid to Nicaragua (Norsworthy 1990, 164). The loss of this money hit the
country much harder than the loss of bilateral U.S. assistance, as it was earmarked for
projects that would help the Sandinistas reach their goal of creating a robust economy
that could meet the basic needs of its population.
The suspension of U.S. economic aid to the Nicaraguan government lasted
throughout the 1980s while the United States supported the contra forces fighting against
the FSLN. Without economic aid from the United States and other donors the U.S.
influenced, the Sandinistas lost crucial economic support for much needed reforms and
development projects in Nicaragua. However, this loss of funds soon became the least of
the Sandinistas worries as fighting in Nicaragua forced them to allocate more and more of
their spending towards defense. Defense spending continued to be a top priority for the
Sandinista government right up to their loss in the 1990 elections. The victory of Violeta
Barrios Chamorro brought an end to Sandinista rule. With a candidate it had supported in
power, the United States ended its efforts to prevent Nicaragua from receiving economic
aid.
Chamorro’s victory not only ushered in an end to U.S. efforts to isolate Nicaragua
from international aid donors, it also brought about a few years of intense U.S. efforts to
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fund Nicaraguan development. During the 1990s, the amount of aid Nicaragua received
from the United States was much larger than any decade before. This trend of increased
funding began as soon as Chamorro entered office with the largest donation to date,
$224.5 million. Though monetary amounts fell considerably in 1992 from the $219
million delivered in 1991 to $76 million, funding spiked again in 1993. Though the
Chamorro government received more economic aid from the United States than any
Nicaraguan government before, this aid did not translate directly into development. In
order to receive U.S. funds, Nicaragua was forced to meet a number of requirements.
These requirements for the receipt of aid funding made post-war recovery arduous. The
percentage of the Nicaraguan population in poverty increased and from 1991 to 93 GDP
growth was negative (Haugaard 1997). Though the United States made initial efforts to
support Chamorro, with the Sandinistas out of power and the Cold War over Nicaragua
could “no longer be construed as a national-security threat which needed to be confronted
with all of America’s diplomatic, military, economic, and private resources (Norsworthy
1990, 153).” Despite Nicaragua’s continued economic plight and their continuing efforts
to recover from a decade of war, funding from the United States fell consistently in the
mid-90s and then resumed its previous pattern of fluctuation: a dramatic spike in funding
arriving every three or four years only to be followed by downturns for the following
year.

Military funding: the contra cop-out
Reagan’s Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, argued, “the contras were a
‘cop-out’ providing the illusion of solving the problem while escalating the
level of violence” (Ruttan 1996, 312).
United States military aid to Nicaragua in the second half of the 20th century is
marked by two key periods. These periods are separated not only by the nature of U.S.
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military aid, but also by the nature of the government controlling Nicaragua as they
unfolded. The first of these periods took place while the Somoza dictators ruled
Nicaragua. It was characterized by fluctuations in military aid to the Somoza regime
based on threats facing the United States and a nearly complete lack of attention to the
abuses the Somoza regime regularly perpetrated. Though efforts to link military aid to
human rights improvements did occur, this transpired just a few years before the
Somozas were ousted and the Sandinista forces took control of the Nicaraguan
government. This transfer of control was the catalyst for the second period of U.S.
military funding in Nicaragua, which took place throughout the 1980s. During this
period, the United States gave substantial amounts of covert aid to the contras to help
create, train, and fund the opposition group. Like funds transferred to the Somozas,
military funds given to the contras were donated without regard to the tactics the contras
employed or the impact continued war had on Nicaragua.
Clearly, despite the changes in the Nicaraguan government and the way the
United States aided the Nicaraguan military, one factor was constant: the United States
disregarded the needs of the Nicaraguan people when making decisions about military aid
donations. Instead of being influenced by the intense corruption of the Somoza regime
military aid during the first period was motivated by security threats, both real and
perceived, to the United States. These threats took precedent over the Somoza regime’s
efforts to use the military to gain complete control over Nicaragua, including the media,
economy and legal system, and their willingness to commit gross human rights violations
to gain this control.
Despite the obvious ideological issues presented by distributing military aid to the
Somozas, as long as the dictators agreed to cooperate with the United States’ military
interests, military aid continued to flow into Nicaragua. Figure 3 shows the amount of
official military aid Nicaragua received from the United States each year from 1946 to
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2002. Though none of these numbers are very high, they demonstrate the connection
between US foreign policy interests and aid fluctuations. For example, the Eisenhower
administration delivered military aid to Somoza in return for Somoza’s agreement to
allow the CIA to train Guatemalan rebel forces in Nicaragua (Pastor 2002, 25). Of
course, the Somozas’ support also came in handy when real security threats arose.
During the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, Luis Somoza Debayle gained US recognition
and increased military aid by condemning communism and allowing the Cuban
government in exile to launch the Bay of Pigs invasion from Nicaragua. This increased
support saw fruition the following year as military aid from the United States to
Nicaragua almost quadrupled (see Figure 3).
During the 1970s, the last decade of the first period of U.S. military aid to
Nicaragua after World War II, military aid to Nicaragua from the United States was,
much like economic aid, designed to help the Somozas maintain power or to ensure a US
friendly government would succeed the dictators. To this end, military aid funds paid for
the training of National Guard officers and for a counterinsurgency program (Norsworthy
162). However, unlike economic aid, military aid to Nicaragua stopped in 1978 due to
the Somoza government’s failure to improve human rights conditions. Though the
Reagan administration would abide by President Carter’s decisions to end official
military aid to Nicaragua, military funding from the United States continued to flow into
Nicaragua throughout the 1980s. In this second period of funding, military aid went, not
to the Nicaraguan government, but to the contra forces who opposed the Sandinista
government. Much like the decision to fund the Somozas, the United States’ decision to
give military funding to the contras was motivated by a perceived national security threat
in the form of the Sandinistas. U.S. money was used to create, train, and fund the
contras, who in turn launched a guerilla war on the FSLN government that lasted for
years, creating countrywide devastation.
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Though it is clear that the United States supported the contras throughout the
1980s, definite figures on how much money was spent are difficult to determine. Much
of the aid to the contras was delivered through the CIA and deemed covert. Other funds
were funneled through US allies and still more were delivered illegally during 1985 and
1986 as a result of arms deals in Iran. Increasing the impossibility of discovering exact
dollar amounts is the fact that much of the money requested by Reagan was requested as
contingency funding. This label meant the administration was not required to fully
disclose where and how this money was being used, let alone how much was being used
(Robinson 1992, 30).
Despite all this confusion and uncertainty, sources tend to agree that the US gave
$19 million in military aid to the contras during both 1981 and 1982 (Norsworthy 1990,
176). After this, figures diverge. According to William I. Robinson, the amount allotted
for the contras in 1983 was $33 million, but Kent Norsworthy contends the figure for
capital sent to the contras in 1983 came to US$29 million (Ibid.). Though many scholars
have their own sets of figures for the funding the United States allocated to the contras
during the 1980s, Norsworthy’s figures are both more frequently duplicated and more
complete than other sources. These figures, which can be examined in graph 3.C,
demonstrate the consistent and extensive funding given to the contras by the United
States from 1982 right up until 1990.
Regardless of the exact amounts, U.S. funding helped the contras become an even
more powerful, numerous, and better supplied fighting force than the National Guard had
been under the Somozas. By 1986, the contras even had their own incipient air force and
navy (Ibid.). Though the contras had forced the Sandinistas to spend an ever-increasing
amount of the government budget on security and to call a state of siege within
Nicaragua, by the late 1980s the EPS was able to limit the contras’ destruction to certain
areas of the country. Even with their destruction limited to specific areas, the contras still
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managed to wreak havoc on Nicaragua. Between 1980 and 1987, the contras had killed,
kidnapped or injured 18,663 Nicaraguans (Gómez 2003, 168). The large number of
people killed is a small surprise considering the tactics the contras were trained by the
United States to use against their enemies. U.S. issued training manuals given to the
contras listed “the selective assassination of civilian government officials, police, and
military personnel” and the “public ‘neutralization’ of civilians believed to collaborate
with the Nicaraguan Government” as model tactics (Ibid., 169). The contras also targeted
workers in social service sectors, such as education and medicine, to ensure fewer people
in the Nicaraguan rural community received the government provided social services
they had grown to expect in the early 1980s (Walker and Armony 2000, 76).
In addition to encouraging brutal tactics, U.S. funding and training of the contras
provided the contras with the ability to begin fighting and then to continue fighting for
years on end (Orozco 2002, 67). The importance of U.S. aid to sustaining the contras is
clearly demonstrated by the effect of diminished U.S. aid to the group in the late-1980s.
By this time, the lack of true contra victories over the FSLN and the Iran-contra scandal
had caused the public in the United States to almost completely lose support for aiding
the contras. As a result, the government voted to curtail military aid to the contras in
1987. As aid from the United States dwindled, it forced a stalemate in the fighting in
Nicaragua and soon led to the beginning of negotiations between the contras and the
Sandinistas.
When the fighting finally stopped, Nicaragua had been devastated. Estimates on
the total monetary cost of the contra war on Nicaragua hover around $2.5 billion, two
years worth of Nicaragua’s GNP in 1994. In addition to the monetary cost, Nicaragua
contended with an estimated death toll of 35,000 (Ibid., 103). Along with the physical
destruction continued war created, there were also social implications. After years of
fighting for political change that would bring freedom, development, and stability in their
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country, the Nicaraguan people were left with a culture that found the solutions to its
political problems on the battlefield (Ibid.). This culture of violence greatly impacted all
of the Nicaraguan people, but its impact was especially strong on the youth and the elite
(Ibid., 102). With the contra war over, former soldiers were left without jobs and
Nicaraguan soon found itself with “tens of thousands of young men – with little training
or experience in anything except violence – [in] the streets” (Walker and Armony 2000,
79).
Though the Nicaraguan government under Chamorro agreed to pardon the rebels
and offered them land and resettlement benefits (Gómez 2003, 174), reintegrating the
demobilized fighting force into Nicaraguan society proved difficult (Walker and Armony
2000, 79). Tensions between ex-contra rebels and other Nicaraguans continued even
after the end of the war and despite Chamorro’s valiant efforts to encourage peace and
reconciliation in the country. By the end of 1990, civil unrest ensued and as early as
1992 re-Contra forces began to emerge (Gómez 2003, 175). These forces, which were
likely made up of ex-contra rebels, used the same violent tactics the contras had resorted
to in land disputes against farmers across the Nicaraguan countryside (Ibid.). Former
members of the Sandinista military (Recompas) also took part in the renewed guerilla
activity and looting and even bands made up of a mixture of both former contra and
former Sandinista forces (Revueltos) joined the fighting (Walker and Armony 2000, 79).
The continued presence of these gangs throughout the 1990s demonstrated that simply
putting an end to the war in Nicaragua could not put an end to the fighting.
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Reversing the revolution

“In Central America, for example, the involvement and participation in
domestic affairs by the CIA and the U.S. in the name of democracy
strengthened the institutions that were causing repression and
authoritarianism in the region (Orozco 2002, 109).”

The United States has always had a major influence in the way Nicaragua is
governed. In its early history, Nicaragua often looked to the United States for help and
guidance in affairs of state. Though the United States’ active control of policy decisions
in Nicaragua ended in the 1930s, its opinion remained a powerful force in the outcome of
political events. Through out their dictatorship, the Somoza family capitalized on the
United States’ new hands-off policy towards Nicaragua and the respect the Nicaraguan
people had for the United States by implying their government had US support.
Uninterested in actively supporting the authoritarian dictator but still leery of
encouraging the forces that opposed him for fear of creating a security threat, the United
States refrained from making clear and consistent statements of support for or opposition
to the regime. However, increasing human rights violations and the possibility that a procommunist government would come to power in Nicaragua caused the United States to
once again take an interest in the country. This interest lasted through out the Reagan
presidency, which devoted a considerable amount of funds and attention to changing the
natural course of events the popular revolution led by the Sandinistas had put in motion.
The United States influence on Nicaraguan politics in the latter half of the 20th
century produced incredibly negative results. Reagan’s support of the contras created
nearly a decade of violent warfare that forced the Nicaraguan government to reallocate
funds from social services to defense spending and left the Nicaraguan people,
countryside, and economy in ruins. Even after the contra war ended, the United States
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continued to use military and economic aid to influence Nicaraguan politics. Both during
the 1990 election and the years that followed, money from the United States greatly
influenced political and economic decisions, complicating the processes of reconciliation
and reconstruction in Nicaragua.
The United States’ post-World War II involvement in Nicaraguan politics did not
begin immediately. Though the United States cooperated with the Central American
nation in a few military alliances and continued to provide aid packages, the period
directly following World War II saw much less involvement from the superpower in the
decisions made by Nicaragua’s government. Interests in events transpiring elsewhere in
the globe and continued military cooperation and anti-communist rhetoric from the
Somoza dictatorship, caused the US to overlook the ideological issues presented by
recognizing the regime. During the Nixon presidency, the United States even went so far
as to support Anastasio Somoza Debayle’s bid for the presidency in the 1974 elections
(Ruttan 1996, 331).
However, this whole-hearted support was short-lived as conditions in Nicaragua
worsened after Somoza Debayle’s reelection. Between January 1975 and January 1978,
the National Guard killed an estimated 3,000 persons in an effort to preserve the Somoza
dictatorship (Gómez 2003, 162). Though the United States long turned a blind eye to the
Somozas’ corruption, growing opposition to the Somoza regime in the late 1970s on the
world stage and in Nicaragua and increased human rights abuses in the wake of rebel
activity in the country led President Carter to change American policy towards the
regime.
Though the Carter administration expressed support for the end of the Somoza era
in Nicaragua, the United States was not ready to allow the opposition groups led by the
FSLN to overthrow Somoza Debayle. Rather than allowing the revolution to take place
on its own or aiding the popular FSLN in their inevitable victory over Somoza Debayle,
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the United States began to channel funding to a number of other groups within Nicaragua
in the hopes that these groups would gain enough strength to control the Nicaraguan
government once Somoza Debayle was ousted. Despite the abuses they perpetrated, the
National Guard was first on the list of foreign aid recipients. The United States also
funded moderate and conservative groups that opposed Somoza Debayle, in the hopes
that these groups would be able to successfully negotiate with the dictator (Ruttan 1996,
307). Unfortunately for the United States, negotiations between Somoza Debayle and
moderate groups quickly deteriorated despite threats that this deterioration would lead to
the termination of US military aid programs to Nicaragua and ensure that no new aid
projects for the country would be created (Ibid., 308).
While the United States busied itself with attempting to create a peaceful transfer
of power, Somoza Debayle continued to use violence and the National Guard to maintain
his control of Nicaragua. Protests and requests for the dictator’s resignation led to
harsher treatment of the opposition by the National Guard and in October 1978 the
government began bombing civilian centers, leaving some 25,000 persons homeless
(Gómez 2003, 162). The dictator’s actions added more fuel to the fire of Nicaraguan
opposition and on July 17, 1979 the Sandinistas were finally able to take Managua.
Though the United States saw the Sandinistas and their Marxist revolutionary
ideology as a threat, once the group came to power President Carter tried to work with
them to make changes in Nicaragua. Carter’s willingness to work with the Sandinistas
was by no means absolute. While negotiating with the FSLN, Carter also channeled the
bulk of US aid to Nicaragua through private organizations and the rightwing business
sector to avoid sending US funds to the FSLN-led government (Norsworthy 1990, 162).
As negotiations between the US and the Sandinistas faltered, the already weak
relationship between the Carter administration and the FSLN cooled as Carter’s
presidency drew to a close. The fizzling of this relationship set the stage for President
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Reagan’s intense opposition to the FSLN and the radical lengths he would go to to oust
them.
The new president saw US support of anti-communist insurgent groups as the key
to the United States’ ideological battle against the Soviets and to maintaining US national
security. Four years before commenting that Nicaragua represented “an unusual and
extraordinary security threat to the national security and foreign policy in the United
States” in 1985(Lamperti 1988, 25), Reagan had begun using covert funding and training
to create a revolutionary army to fight the Sandinistas. Reagan also suspended all U.S.
aid to the Nicaraguan government on January 23, 1981 and began a campaign to use all
of the United States’ considerable influence with international lending institutions and aid
donors to stop other foreign funding from reaching the FSLN government. Between
1981 and 1984 the Reagan administration managed to block $400 million in loans and
credits approved as bilateral and multilateral aid to Nicaragua (Norsworthy 1990, 164).
The loss of this money hit the country much harder than the loss of bilateral U.S.
assistance, as it was earmarked for projects that would help the Sandinistas reach their
goal of creating a robust economy that could meet the basic needs of its population. As
funds diminished, so did the social programs the Sandinistas had been able to provide in
the early 1980s. The disappearance of these programs did their fair share in turning the
rural population of Nicaragua against the Sandinistas.
However, Washington’s battle against the Sandinistas was much more complex
than simply isolating the new government from international funding. While the Reagan
administration blocked aid to the FSLN, it also used money and a number of other tactics
to aid groups in Nicaragua who opposed them. The U.S. embassy in Managua had an
employee assigned to religious affairs who, according to an August 1986 Washington
Post report, “cultivates and organizes protestant religious resistance to the Nicaraguan
government and keeps track of the activity of church figures who favor the government
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(Ibid., 165).” Through this unique employee, the U.S. was able to ensure aid funds were
going to religious groups that opposed the Sandinistas.
Despite the Untied States’ efforts to drum up support for groups that opposed the
Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the U.S. was never able to help the contras gain the confidence
of the Nicaraguan people. Though some peasants from the North and ethnic groups from
the Caribbean coast were members of the contra groups, the contras military members
were predominantly ex-members of Somoza’s National Guard (Gilbert 1988, 165).
These soldiers were associated with Somoza, his sons and the years of military
dictatorship they had used the National Guard to maintain, a factor that prevented them
from receiving support from the Nicaraguan people. Another factor that prevented the
contras from receiving support from the Nicaraguan people was their corruption.
According to reports from the General Accounting Office, more than half of the $12
million given to the contras for humanitarian reasons, including the purchase of supplies,
went, instead, to Miami bank accounts for contra leaders (Coerver 1999, 168).
Despite the obvious lack of support for the contras from the Nicaraguan
population, intense funding and encouragement from the United States to the contras
continued well into 1987. This support kept the contras from negotiating with the
Sandinistas, leading to years of low intensity warfare. Continuing conflict forced the
FSLN government to continue to divert funds from social programs to defense spending,
deeply hindering efforts the Nicaraguan government was making to rebuild after years of
corrupt rule. In 1985 60% of Nicaragua’s national budget, 40% of its material output and
25% of the GNP went towards defense efforts (Robinson 1992, 36). This contrasted
greatly to the early years of the revolution when 50% of the national budget was directed
towards education and health (Gómez 2003, 170).
Luckily for Nicaragua, lack of support in Washington and the promise of a new
election finally brought an end to aid flows from the U.S. to the contras. Attempts to win
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a military victory in Nicaragua had clearly failed, and the U.S. saw the 1990 election as a
new opportunity to remove the Sandinistas from power. As the United States began
directing funds to the Unión Nacional Opositora (UNO), the fourteen party opposition
group to the Sandinistas, instead of the contras, a military stalemate between the contras
and the Sandinistas was finally reached and negotiations for peace began.
As the battle between the Sandinistas and the contras came to an end, the
political battle between the Sandinistas and the UNO was initiated. Though the UNO
was the largest group opposing the FSLN, it was also still relatively weak. The
Sandinistas were better organized in their campaigning and were able to use some
government resources to their advantage (Merrill 1993, 49). In order to counteract this
advantage and increase the likelihood of a UNO victory in the 1990 election, newly
elected President George H. W. Bush requested $9 million in direct campaign aid to the
UNO (Robinson 1992, 60). Rather than clearing this sort of direct funding, Congress
okayed the delivery of money to Nicaragua that would strengthen infrastructure and
institutions.
With direct funding denied, the Bush administration began funding the UNO and
their candidate, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, through the CIA, the National Endowment
for Democracy, and other government groups. Through these groups the United States
spent a total of $30 million on Nicaragua’s national elections (Ibid.). Efforts to support
the UNO also came through other U.S. channels. In January 1990, just one month before
the election in Nicaragua, President Bush sent letters to the chairmen of the Democratic
and Republican parties requesting direct cash donations be made to the UNO. This
request was followed by a similar one extended to European and Asian governments by
Secretary of State James Baker (Ibid., 294). The result was an influx of tactical advice
and tens of millions of dollars in covert and overt aid to any parties or politicians who
would join the UNO (Walker and Armony 2000, 77).
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When the election results were tabulated in February 1990, they demonstrated the
strength of U.S. influence. Despite occupying a consistent second place in the polls taken
prior to the election, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro had won 55% of the vote to FSLN
candidate Daniel Ortega’s 41% (Merrill 1993, 50). Chamorro’s victory ushered in a few
years of intense U.S. efforts to fund Nicaraguan development in an attempt to ensure the
continued popular support for the U.S. friendly government (Haugaard 1997). However,
this funding was dependent upon Chamorro’s adherence to a number of economic
policies suggested by the United States, the World Bank and the IMF. These policies not
only made reconciliation difficult, they also increased the poverty rate in Nicaragua.
Despite the damage caused by the policies they created, the United States quickly lost
interest in Nicaragua. With the Sandinista threat removed, the Cold War winding down,
and a government beholden to the United States in power, the need to meddle in
Nicaraguan domestic policy dwindled and the United States stepped back to watch the
events it set in motion run their course.

Discovering the real security threat

The war in Nicaragua was a dispute over the meaning of democracy and
democratization in Nicaragua. One side believed that democracy is an
exercise of sovereignty and self-determination that lies exclusively in the
hands of the citizenry while the other saw democracy from the United States
perspective, as content and process, as universal suffrage, freedom of the
market, and anti-Communism (Orozco 2002, 55).
From the outset, the FSLN coming to power in Nicaragua was perceived by the
United States as a national security threat. This perception originated before the
Sandinistas came to power and escalated steadily until members of the Reagan
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administration would go so far as to break the law to continue to support opposition
forces in Nicaragua. Reagan claimed “Nicaragua was participating in ‘aggressive
activities’ and had allied itself with the Soviet Union in the East-West conflict” (Lamperti
1988, 25), even though there was little evidence to support these claims. A leading
historian on Nicaragua, Thomas W. Walker explains though the members of the FSLN
did adhere to Marxist ideologies, “this simply meant that they – like an increasing
number of Third World intellectuals – saw economics as a major determinant of social
and political matters, believed in the reality of class struggle, identified imperialism as a
major problem for the Third World, saw military and educational establishments as
inherently political, and so on. The acceptance of these ideas did not mean they believed
in the possibility of creating Marx’s communist utopia in Nicaragua (Walker 1985, 23).”
In fact, when the FSLN ousted Somoza Debayle in 1979, it was working as a broad-based
national movement concerned primarily with ridding Nicaragua of the Somoza regime
and rebuilding the country.
Though the Sandinistas shared the origin of their belief system with the Soviets,
their connection to the superpower was not as strong as Reagan indicated. On the
contrary, the members of the FSLN had long tried to remain out of Moscow’s sphere of
influence. These efforts began with the creation of the FSLN, which originally formed as
an alternative to the Soviet-sponsored Partido Socialista Nicaraguense (PSN). The
founders of the FSLN decided to create their own organization because they believed the
PSN was too closely linked to Moscow (Walker and Armony 2000, 71). Over time the
Sandinistas became even further removed from the PSN and the Soviets. It grew from
the original student group to include other members of Nicaraguan society and also made
alliances with Christian based communities through the Catholic clergy, which helped
broaden the movement’s appeal even further (Ibid.).
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By the time the FSLN took control of Managua, it was allied with a number of
other opposition groups in Nicaragua and received the backing of the Nicaraguan people
as well as that of many other Latin American nations. These other Latin American
countries, such as Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, and Costa Rica (Lamperti
1988, 26), not the Soviet Union, gave the Sandinistas much of the economic, military and
political support necessary to finally overthrow Somoza Debayle. While the Sandinistas
did receive aid contributions from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, these
contributions made up less than a quarter of the aid the government received from 1979
to 1984 (Ibid., 28).
Though Reagan claimed the problems in El Salvador and Nicaragua were the
USSR’s effort to destabilize Central America (Ruttan 1996, 311), Moscow was quite
surprised by the changes taking place in Nicaragua at the beginning of the 1980s because
the Moscow-line socialist party in Nicaragua had reported the country was not yet ready
for revolution (Lamperti 1988, 26). Regardless of this surprise, many news reports
appeared in Nicaragua and the United States throughout the 1980s which seemed to
support the Reagan administration’s claims that Nicaragua was a “safe house, a command
post for international terror” (Coerver 1999, 150). Though they appeared in many
reputable news sources, many articles began as government “leaks”, which were actually
completely fabricated (Walker and Armony 2000, 75). The propaganda mill for the
contra war also churned in the Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the
Caribbean. Shut down in December 1987 for engaging in prohibited activities, the office
had engaged in covert propaganda such as planting articles favorable to the contras in the
U.S. press and illegal lobbying (Coerver 1999, 164).
Though much of the threat posed by the Sandinistas was both exaggerated and
fabricated, this did not stop the United States from using its economic and military aid
policies to combat the perceived security threat. United States aid policy in Nicaragua
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during the Somoza regime set the precedent for the link between U.S. national security
threats and aid fluctuation. However, it did not prepare Nicaragua for the damage U.S.
interference in the country would create in the 1980s. Through use of economic and
military aid, the United States was able to demolish the revolution it had taken the
Sandinistas twenty years to build in less than ten. With the perceived Sandinista threat
removed, U.S. aid numbers reduced considerably and then resumed the irregular flow
they had followed during the Somoza regime. Unfortunately, Nicaragua could not boast
a similar return to normalcy.

Conclusion

Throughout the history of the United States foreign assistance program, the
primary objective of foreign assistance policy has always been to improve the security of
the United States. This is demonstrated in the rhetoric used to discuss foreign assistance,
the policies and institutions created to distribute aid, and the correspondence between
historical events and changes in aid flow and allocation. As the foreign assistance
program evolved, policy makers altered the means used to ensure the attainment of the
United States national security to include long-term programs geared towards increasing
the prosperity of developing countries. Despite the addition of this aspect of the program,
the containment doctrine and the fear of “falling dominos”, not long-term development
goals, were the main factors impacting foreign assistance funding. This is evident in
foreign assistance history and distribution, as represented in Figure 1 and Figure 2, as
well as in the history of foreign assistance to Afghanistan and Nicaragua outlined in parts
three and four.
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Though many aspects of the United States foreign assistance policy to these two
countries differed, in both instances the United States’ fear of communist expansion and
lack of knowledge concerning the true nature of the difficulty facing each country led it
to incorrectly assess the nature of the security threats emanating from Afghanistan and
Nicaragua. In Afghanistan this meant the United States denied assistance to a
government truly interested in committing to the United States’ vision of development
and democratization, a decision that pushed Afghanistan towards increasing ties to the
Soviet Union. This decision eventually led to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which
began an over 22-year period of warfare, destruction and instability in the country. At
the end of this time period, any possible positive effects Afghanistan could have derived
from spotty ineffective economic aid distributed by the United States before the SovietAfghan War had been obliterated, social upheaval was widespread, weapons and
landmines littered the country, and a terrorist network that would greatly impact the
security of the world in the next century was growing. Despite all this, when the United
States believed the possibility of a communist threat was removed, foreign assistance was
also withdrawn leaving Afghanistan to flounder unaided in instability and allowing a real
security threat tot eh United States to grow.
Though the situation in Nicaragua was less an issue of neglect and more an issue
of unnecessary interference, the decisions the United States made based on faulty
information concerning the severity of the communist threat led to consequences similar
to those in Afghanistan. After the United States supported years of brutal dictatorship in
Nicaragua it falsely accused the popular revolutionary government that finally rid the
country of this bane of working with the Soviet Union to spread communism. Along
with this unfounded accusation, the United States sent extensive support to a fringe
insurgent movement, the contras, strengthening them enough to enable them to wreak
havoc in Nicaragua for an entire decade. When extensive covert and overt aid to the
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contras failed to it bring about the changes in the Nicaraguan government the United
States desired, the country used other forms of foreign assistance to ensure the election of
their chosen presidential candidate. When the election resulted in the establishment of a
government devoid of any sort of connection to communism, whether authentic or
superficial, the United States’ interest in Nicaragua waned leaving the nation to fight an
uphill battle against the militarism, poverty, and corruption the United States had helped
create without the benefit of U.S. foreign assistance funding.
Though the study of the United States’ foreign assistance program and the
security concerns of the nation during the cold war help illuminate the connection
between support for foreign assistance and perceived security threats to the United States,
it does nothing to illuminate the true effect the United States foreign assistance policies
have on recipient nations. Through examining the events taking place in Afghanistan and
Nicaragua between 1947 and 2001 as a result of the foreign assistance decisions the
United States has made in regard to these countries it is clear that the link between the
United States foreign assistance policy and national security is incredibly detrimental to
recipient nations. In both Afghanistan and Nicaragua, foreign assistance from the United
States was harmful in three ways: the lack of clear connection between aid flows and the
issues facing aid recipients created dramatic fluctuations in aid giving which wreaked
havoc on fragile economies; the proliferation of weapons and advanced military training
in already turbulent situations increased their danger and helped create a culture of
violence within recipient countries; and consistent undermining of existing governments
or popular revolutions through US interference into the policies of each country stripped
their governments of authority and autonomy. In addition to revealing the incredibly
negative effect the United States assistance distribution policies for Afghanistan and
Nicaragua had on these countries, the study of the United States’ assistance program also
reveals that many of the decisions the United States made between 1947 and 2001 were
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based on unfounded fears of communist expansion and a poor understanding of the issues
facing recipient countries.

Figure 3

U.S. Covert Military Aid to Afghan Rebels during the 1980s
Year
Amount of aid
1980
$30 million
1981
$35 million
1982
$35-50 million
1983
$80 million
1984
$122 million
1985
$280 million
1986
$470-550 million
1987
$600 million
1988
$400 million
1989
$400-550 million
Goodson, Larry P. Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the
Taliban. University of Washington Press. Seattle, Washington. 2001. p.146
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